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*.4gm*+\^miY*m Qtf Budget THlf tllfllM
in
The defense budget baa become a central consideration of top raaa-
in the Department of Defense, particularly aince the enactment of
the national Security ct of 1>7. In fact, it has developed into the cost
important force leading toward "real" uniflcation in the Defense Department
under the planning, progrm—Ing and bud^etlo-; system, inaugurated by the
teas of Robert 8. Mdtaa&ra and Charles J. Hitch in 1a4.
Today it is Mensmil/ accepted that strategy, pi!Ogramnilng and budget-
lag are all aspects of the suae basic decisions. Military plans, no natter
hov ambitiously formulated* are meaningless admass unless they are fwiallilii
and are supported by budgets, and, additionally, defease budgets are a waste
of public funds if they are not based on sound and meaningful national
seourity policy.
The defense budget of the United States is the concern of people in
say different areas of the world for various reasons* It has a trsawndoua
Impact on the economic, political and socic-psycholocieol aspects of both
domestic and international situations. What are the major motives for
budgetary reforms a3n^ the evolution of financial management in the Defease
Department in recent years? They can be traced to many interrelated factors.
She most outstanding elements may be related to (1) increased defense
^Charles J. Ultch, Decision-Making for Defense (Berkeley, Calif.:
University of California Press, 1^65), p. 3A.

expenditures, (2) strengthened civilian control,, (3) enhanced efficiency and
ooonony, and (4) revolutionised military strategy and technology*
* * »i i«^ ! » ——mm>*ai*mim wmmmtmtmimt pip»ppppppJp»p»p»*p»ppwppppp» —< «iiMiynwm ip i--^- *«-<*>—. «wnn.^T^MMCtw«LT »ii iiiiri»-ipi»<p»pp«appM»p^pp^»pZppUpp»ppSpt-
Since World War XI, the increased international role of the United States,
vith accompanying responsibilities to aeet cold war confrontation and sporad-
ic local conflicts, and the enoraous coete of contemporary weapon system,
together vith the continuing coete of previous wars, have pushed defense
spending to tremendous anouuts. For the Fiscal tear l£§?j President igradou
B. Johnson presented to the Congress a $58.3 billion defense budget, anount-
iaj to 5*1.7 percent of the <pve*inent'a total outlays proposed for that
year* ****** asount was roughly 3 percent of the estimated dross nationalJ ^P^PPPI W MHW4PW PPMMW^HMV ^* PP^^1P *• ^P^WPP^PP^W*'** ^"* IT^" ^^^PW»W ^P»PP ^^p^^p ^*P^P WWpP^W^ ^P^P^^P W VWW mw^P* ^PPP^^^i^pPPiW
Product for 106e% Its iapact on the nation's economy as a whole, and on
business and industry in tores of price, esp&eyiaent, and growth is oijsifi-
****••" • "*pa^e%flj»w#4p
*™»iy *e> w w^#^«apjwet •^•w va*p <fcppp^a* #* *" a^fcp^ef HHWwauai* s. *w^ a*^pyfc^p»*» *•%•%*
economic and political considerations from the defense budget*
(2) Civilian control-—the problem of power structure in the Defease
Departapnt.—Hie concept of civilian control is an ideology of a desocratic
society. Ohis belief, faith and tradition have been firmly Irih-Wldert in the
Constitution of the United States, which oaken the President, a civilian,
balances aecbaniszos between tfcfr legislative ^wwd executive branches of the
^The Washington Post, January 13, l$6$t pp. 1 and *7*
Frederick C* Masher and Orville F. Pollard, She Costs of /osarican
Qo^rmanU Facts, IVends,* »ftgs (Haw York: Dodd Mead, 1^64), pp. lOo-llQi
Jack fiayaoad, Power at the Pentagon (Sew York: harper & flow, LjJt), pp. 30o-
311; J* a. Stockf'iscn (ed.), p!lanpinfi and Forecasting in the Defense Indus-
tries (Belxaont, Calif*: Wadevo/th Publishing Co., 1/2).

Uf»mi iHUnt as In the case of declaration of war, appropriations of funic
and appointments of officers*
Particularly today, the development of thermonuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles with highly sophisticated control systems seems to call
for greater and stronger civilian control over military strategy, pro^pswe
and operations* It it generally accorded in the United States that civil-
ians should antes final decisions about the kinds of military strategy to
use in vaglng a war, the types of weapons system to be developed and, noet
Important, what weapons should be enployed in a specific place and time and
for what purpose* The professional military leaders are now ashed mainly




the eyes of most taxpayers the government in general is responsible for in-
efficiency# waste and extravagance, the military establishment betas no
exception* Frequently these attitudes arise from criticism for the govern-
ment's lar^e amounts of spending* Those outside pressures for economy and
efficiency in government operations, coupled with the drive for better
mans^sment in the top echelon of the managerial hierarchy, have brought
about better decision-making for efficient allocation of resources, optimum
of the resources available, and cost reduction through improved pro-
Defense spending, which is nondivisible* nossmrlDStable and equally
available to the general nubile* is vulnerable to continuous attacks*
"Hj. 3*, Constitution, rt. 1, sec* 8.
nBemuel K Huntington, rower, Expertise and Military Profession
me Policy, od. Wesley w. Pi
Press, IJ03), ». l©>l:tf.
/j»arlean Defens , ijeslm * Foevar otol. (Baltimore, Md*. She





criticisms and outcrioo for more scoHnay and efficiency in the defense
aanagsmont are of a navor-onfling nature* Therefore, the demands for better
saaagsasnt of defence dollars are a constant cUrtieaje to both military
and civilian officials In the defense establishment.
(h) Revolution In tallitary strategy and technolOKar»~As President
Dui^ht D. Eisenhower predicted in ljj&, today there is no separate ground,
sea or air warfare and all strategic and tactical units oust be integrated,
unified and directed in order to be fully efficient and effective. aaal
applies not only to combat operations in the field but also to top
aent In the Defense Department In planning and controlling the execution of
programs* The advent of nadorn weapons systems, with the great technical
complexity, lengthy lead tins and enomoue costs have tmdit centralised
It is the premise of this paper that a combination of the above
elements has been the major driving force behind the unification issue in
the Defense Department which purports to produce unity of command, better
coordination among the ailitary as well ao civilian^nilitary departasnts
and agencies, and the increased economy and efficiency through centralised
authority in the Secretary of Defense for defense planning and control.
The following chapter will eaantno the development of the defease
reorganisations in the United States since World efer XI In the HJUt of the
above premise and will show how the new management tool of pianolas, pro»
srsaatas and budastias ass achieved the lo
jSasclal assssae to the Con \joo on fameasalssaism of the Defease
£fetabllsbment, April 3, XJ&9 Public Papers of the Presidents! Dwl^ht P.
tUnnhnwii , 1^8 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, IjLO),
K WE '

unification without erection of a single service or a single Chief af
Staff system and without prior congressional approval. In the lost chapter
,
the i jaerloan defense system will be used in a discussion of the Korean
defense system* with ffi* nr i no Mnnti implications for the sjsnss)sment of the
Korean nilitary establishment*
Primary information for this paper was obtained through library
research* Background in the historical development of the United States
defense fflrapMils*^
y
»-ft and raiV-lt-^y budgetary procedures was compiled from
current literature in this field*

CBvPSER I
MOTORIC JU imSLOEVSm OP MW3BJS BBQRO Ud TKM
AS JOiJCT J?X DUDOtSBC IB SOS UIHTiD GX BB
Since the Budget and . commtlng Act wi enacted in ljfil, ostahl tufa-
Oat, the national budget system la the United States, until World War II, the
essential role and procedure o£ \*x\j3tAf\£ ^n the military dep&xrtueats wore
not fundamentally caanyou* Military budgets vera prepared on the toasts of
Objects of ^wtttflttiirsB la the lamwim of the 9svy *m^ War DepartBenta. fi*ift
their respective Secretorlos tpsasnltted then to the Congress as a natter
Sf snSSBi BM cei\.'U..o ";V IkS nHBfSnviSlslSBl "O^iOOU" mm mjm|m .f,? m Sa
ay the bureaus thsnaelves, and aost of the spprflifl^iitloiiff wore made to the
bureau level and belov.
!£he Second World War revealed that the ssrvless were relatively un*
successful in the nsnoetlmo develanaeixt of v»«<w atmts/tic and «nfr*iiimA-trmW^^ppp^^pr^^WWP* «^p^p vjm* *^pjp*"^f l^v*«wv^w *pp^w w *p'*^p«p«^papNPPkwi^ ^^^p> «p>^^^i» ^pi *^ ^» »»^ w^'^^LJ**^ ^^pppww p«w ••^i^b^pp"'*w«»^^«
plans and consequently their initial eetlastes for row aaterlala were past "
tlcally worthless and proved to be sere guesswork* ccordiaj to Luther
OuUcu, the war was not what the planners thought, and did not cose as they
had ina&lnad* Since World War II there have been numerous activities, ex-
porinonts, and isprovisstlons as well as sons very fundamental and flxn
Frederick c. Hasher, Progran Budgeting; gpaory and Practice
(Sav loras Ansrlcan Book - Stratford Press, Inc., id^t), p. 5S>»
Luther Qullck, « ^fart.^fftrstlws Reflections frog World War II
(University, Alahanat University of Oabaca Press, ijfo), pT 46.

In the rtii fiiaii orjjaai&atiou, vita iacreafii..
organisational unification and a strottjer civilian control over c&litary
strategy, proGroffloiac; and bud^otinu. Iho initial ^ttasyt in this diroc*
tion materialised as the puiftps of the national Security Act of 1.AY.
The national Security ct of XJS(
&n>lanaUoae of the exact tine sod omises of Military unification
vary Tffnc Military historians* Sone contend that one reason we the
attempt to establish the autonomy of air power during the early lJ20*s,
others claim it woe wartime inefficiency and vuste, and still others attrib-
ute it to the successful interservlee coordination during the Second World
I
.~ Whatever the reasons, and in spite of too introduction of at least
sixty unification hills in the Congress since 1 421. as veil as numerous
hearings in the Congress, military unification woe not substantiated until
the enactment of the ffetlonal Security ct of 1*7*
Q» National Security .vet was the first step toward unification
after long, arduous and earnest efforts of many people, including President
Barry S. Truman* the first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestolj ferdinand
Bberstadt) Generals Dvi^it D« i&senhover, lowton J. Collins, and Laurie
Ibrstadt; admirals wiliiaia D. Leahy, Chester W. Simlte, and Barrett
Sherman; and the ttambers of the Senate Cosaitteos of *Ulitary Affairs and
2
B&vol ffairs, to nope a few.
One -ray's Collins Plan vhlch van submitted to the Congress in 1
^fehn c. files, Qua memeiseiit of Pefense (Baltimore, m.: Tho Johns
BopUins University Press,
n?aul Y. Qummnd, Orffonjaiffi for Defense (Princeton, fl.J.: Prince-
ton University Press, 1,^1), pp. l*io-226.~

8Truman, but the then-Secretary of the Bavy James Forrestol and the Navy
as a vhole strongly opposed this plan. Instead, Mr. Forrestal proposed
the so-called Eberstadt Plan which represented a lesser degree of unifica-
tion and relied heavily on decentralisation and a coordinating committee
system. Major disagreements between the Army and the Havy were over these
factors: (1) the authority of the Secretary of Defense, (2) establishment
of a Single Chief of Staff, (3) the land-based naval air am, and (k) the
status and the missions of the Marine Corps.
x
She iray insisted on a strongly centralised Department of Defense
under a Secretary, with the existing Departments reduced to three coordinat-
ed "branches" of subordinate status. She Havy, on the other hand, favored
unification, but only "in a less drastic and extreme form." It assented to
a separate Department of the ir Force, but the Havy wanted to retain full
department status for the Xfevy with Cabinet rank for its Secretary. It
viewed the role of the Defense Secretary as "a presidential deputy with
clearly defined powers of decision over specific matters" who would not run
the Department.
To explain the reasons for differences in opinions between the two
services is beyond the scope of this study, but a few comments deserve
mention:
First was the different concept or approach in management. This
may be traced to the differing modes of operations. Traditionally, the
rmy used to operate on land masses with large numbers of troops, whereas
the Havy operations were scattered over the vast areas of the sea* The
Salter Mills (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (Hsw York: The Vikings




former needed closer centralisation of authority, whereas the latter pre-
ferred decentralised operations.
Second was Secretary Forrestal's belief, based on his experience
as Secretary of the Havy, that a single Secretary of Defense would be unable
to handle such great responsibility and, therefore, ouch of his authority
necessarily would fall into the hands of his Military advisors. Consequent-
ly, the Defense Secretary would have authority without knowledge, and would
inevitably become an Impotent Secretary which meant weakened civilian control.'
thirdly, unification of the iirmed Forces, as Mr. Ibrrestal viewed it,
wee neither necessary nor desirable as a weans of solving pressing problems,
especially those of economy a-od efficiency.
Finally, Fbrrestal desired to keep the Savy intact as a distinct
service, not merely as a subordinate branch of a vast Defense Department;
he feared, as did the aavy, that unification was designed less to streamline
the Pentagon organisation than to relegate the Sfevy to a Junior status in
the military establishment. Under the various rmy plans, the Havy would
cease to be an autonomous department, and would not be indlvidualistlcally
represented in the Cabinet, Ho anticipated that the choice of > rasd forces
Secretary would be influenced far more by the ^rmy than by the *Javy, and
concluded that there was only a slight chance that he or any other naval
3
official would be appointed to the position.
Whatever the arguments, the unification became a reality when the






., pp. &&-&j. Iso see Arnold . . nogow, James fbrrestal, -









ct on July 2l, 1^7 • Ironically, Jaaee Forrestal vai appointed by President
Truman as the first Secretary of Defease and was confirmed on July 27, 1A'(
by the Senate.
The national Security ct followed, in the main, specifications set
up by Mr* Forrestal, which originally were developed by Ferdinand fiberstudt,
his long-time consultant and friend. It established three levels or cate-
gories in the defense organisation. The national mchinery consisting of
the national Security Council and the Rational Security Resources Board was
placed at the apex* She national military si t it) >1 Jshwwiiit consisted of two
levels; the first level* headed by the Secretary of Defense, consisted of
four consittees: the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the War Council, the Munitions
Board, and the Research and Development Board. The second level Included
the three military departments—the Army, Havy, and ir Force, and the uni-
fied field commands* The Aft specified that the Secretary of Defense be a
civilian, and that he be the "principal assistant to the President in all
o
matters relating to national security
.
His duties were (1) to establish general policies and programs for
the national military establishment; (2) to exorcise general direction,
authority and control over the establishment; (3) to eliminate unnecessary
duplication or overlap in procurement, supply, transportation, storage,
health, and research; and (4) to supervise and coordinate budget matters of
the <mm«oinil activities, including formulation of budget estimates for the
establishment. However, his power was limited to "general direction, author-
ity and control" over the departments and he woo not to administer the in-
dividual departments* The ct specified that 'all powers and duties
^Mills, pp. ZjG-tf.
^tlonal Security f ct of Vjk'l, P.L. 253, &)th Cong., July 20, Ijk't.

11
relating to such departments not specifically conferred upon the Secretary
of Defense by this Act shall be retained by each of their respect! /e sec-
retaries." And the powers of the Defense Secretary were not to he con-
strued so as to prevent free access of the service sealstories to the
2
President.
As will become clearer later, the Act did not work out as originally
planned. In fact two years later Secretary Forrestol, who advocated, pro-
posed, and defended strongly the decentralised caandttee system of the de-
fense organization, had to reecsnend significant changes. a Charles J*
Hitch declares, "the National Security Act of Iff!? established not a unified
deportment or even a federation, but a confederation of three military de-
partments presided over by a Secretary of Defense with carefully enumerated
po«er..»3
Title IV of IjkJ
Secretary of Defense Jhrnss Forreetol found himself frustrated within
a little more than a year, since the system he had espoused did not work*
In his first annual report he recommended a broad clarification of his powers
by making it clear that the Secretary of Defense has the responsibility for
eoBrcizlng "direction, authority and control" [note deletion of the word
"eeneral" in the original . ct j over the military departments and defense
agencies of the National Military Establishment, a provision for on Under






uone of the three or a fourth), and elimination of the three service
secretaries from membership on the national Security Council.
United defense budgets imposed by President Truman through the
"remainder method," and mounting interserviee conflicts, notably between
the aftr force and the Heavy over the Jurisdiction of nuclear bombs—the
rapidly developing ultimate weapons—characterized the first two years of
the unification experiment. Essentially the root of the disputes may be
saa e^^w^^^A \^%j wuw sveeeMa ata^ v<* ^a**^»^^wAvv# ^^^^me^pj^* '^a* v^^h^b^vsza ^^b^^w e^^^*^ w ^^•^•ey • •s>^^ ^w^^^p^wee^B^^^^
naturally from disagreements over the roles and missions of each service.
Realising the relationship of service roles and missions to the problems of
budget allocations, Secretary Forrestal attempted to clarify the roles
through an interservice negotiation treaty at Key West, Florida, later
—ended at Sewport, Rhode Island. The treaty failed from the outset as a
basis for the service agreement; in fact, the services disagreed about the
correct interpretation even before its publication.
soother significant development in this period was the establish*
meat in IjkQ of the McHamey Board, headed by ir Force General Joseph T.
Mcflorney and composed of Vice dmiral Robert B. Carney and Army Major
General George J. Richards. This board was to review ami advise the Joint
Chiefs of Staff of the defense budgets for Fiscal Tear U5Q» The board was
able to cut the proposed budget from $30 billion to |C3*6 billion; even so,
this amount exceeded by v,.2 billion the projected ceiling of $14.4 billion
Tlrst Report of the Secretary of Defense< IjkQ (Washington: U. S.
Government Printing Office, IAj), j®. 3-^.
TXiring the late 1^0* c the military agencies were allocated an
arbitrary fraction of what was left over in the budget after interest







set by Preeident Trunin. Ithough Mr. Forreetol played * constructive
role as an intermediary i*tween the White House and the Joint Chiefs of
3ta?f, he had no statutory power to force & real agreement within an
approved ceiling*
Shortly after issuance of the Secretary's report, the Hoover Con*
mission Task Force on liitlonal Security Organisation submitted its report
to Congress in January 1A/. The Task Force was headed lay Ferdinand
Sberstadt, the chief architect of the Havy plija. It emphasized the relative
of the Secretary of Defense and the need to give hla a greater
authority over the service departments with particular reference to their
2
fund requests and their expenditures. The recontaead&tions of the Hoover
CosKdssion Task Force closely resembled the l-eport of Secretary Forrestal.
It rarrammnrtnil deleting the word "general' from the Secretary's authority,
sharpening the Secretary's ibud&etary control. elijalaatlna the provisions to
permit appeals by the service secretaries directly to the President, and re-
moving the "reserve rowers" rlniiso ttiaafi chemcsea would clarify and strengthen
ti» Secretary's authority—cud providing a chairman for the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. 3
However, none of the Hoover Couslsslon Task Force reoouaauidatlonc to
give the Secretary of Defense better control over departmental budgets were
Included in the President's reorganisation reoomeemdatlons or in the early
draft of the lykj reorganisation bill—the fydlags bill. During the testi-
mony on the Tydings bill the ehairiaan of the Task Force, Mr. Sberstadt,
gaated that the Senate conaite adding fiscal provisions to the bill. Ho
contended that without a cor^lete overhaul In budget procedures and fiscal







policies there would be no substantial lufaevemsnt la economy and effi-
ciency. The Senate committee asked bin to write such aa asftndment;
auently this suggestion became Title IV of tbe Ijkj Reorganisation Act.
On august 22, 19*9 tho provioions of tbe reorganisation bill
lav aa the national Security ct . aendnrmta of ljr ., Public la* 21u. It wae
another step toward unification. In this awsinflmsiit the primacy of the
Secretary of Defense aa the principal assistant to the President on defense
natters was emphasised by deleting the word "general" along with the 'vo-
servod power provision." The service departments lost their status ae execu-
tive deportments. The Secretary was given a Deputy Secretary and three
/.ssictant Secretaries i a chairman was provided for tho .Toint Chiefs of Staff
,
and the Jbint Staff was increased from 100 to 210 officers. In effect, the
national Military Establishment was converted Into a single
2
service secretaries were removed from the National Security Council.
Title IV, which was added as an afterthought. This created the Office of
the . ssistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) which would play a key role
in the defense z&^aagement reforms in "^wl 1^ years* This office was given
the authority over all defense agencies in budget estimates, accounting, In-
ternal auditing, and statistical reporting, subject to the authority and
direction of tho Secretary of Defense. /Oso it provided a comptroller in
each of the three military deportments with authority and responsibilities









Also of oquul Itpoi-toooo woe tte adoption by the Congress of the
"perforannce budget" Idea to tte defense budget as rceasaaaded by tte first
Boovor Coamlssion. A porforauace budget wue understood by the Coaalsslon
as a "budget based on functions, activities, and work projects rather than
in term of things bought."
In his book, Frederick C. Master concludes that tte proalse of
greater economy and efficiency was the principal "selling" factor for Title
IV. according to Mosher, it was designed, in tike words of the House Com-
adttee on Araad Services, to "place tte operation of the National Military
listablistaent on a sound budgetary and fiscal fflnnagsnwut basis.
Reorganization of 1953
Shortly after his election, President Eisenhower directed his new
Secretary of Defense, Charles £• Wilson, to appoint a coaalttee under tte
direction of Etelson A* Rockefeller, who was also Ghalraan of the President's
dvisory Coiaaittee on aovernasnt Organization* to eicawinft defense organiza-
tion so as to keep his campaign pledge of "security with solvency" and a
"new Look" at defense policy. She Rockefeller Flan, which eventually beceso
Presidential Reorganization Flan ilo. 6 of 19$]p largely reflected tte views
of its members: foraer Secretary of Defense, itobert . Lovett; forner Chair-
ana of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Genu* &*• Bradleyi foraer Chftlrann
s
of tte Research and Developaent Board, vaanevur Bush; and otters.
, Budgeting and Aecountins (Washington: U. S. Oovernaeat Printing
ce, 1^), p. 8.
x






The Rockefeller Report stressed the need far strengthened civilian
control by clarifyinj the authority of the Defense Secretary and his in-
creased exercise of control through the throe civilian secretaries rattier
than the service chief3. Also enphasized was the inproved stratesie pise*
ning of the Joint Chiefs of Stuff, conceiving of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
ss a planning tody rather than a rmananrt agency whose main object vac to
foroulate plans to "cope with the challenge of any
slbility resided with the civilian secretaries, not with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, according to the proposals of change of the Report.
lao included in the proposals was the elimination of the old statu-
tory agencies, the Inanitions Board *mfl the Research and Development Board,
their functions being given to the Secretary of Defense. Six additional
assistant secretaries were to be added to the Secretary of Defease as his
Insult 1 te staffs, which would sake up nine assistant secretaries rather than
the previous three* President Eisenhower noted that econony could be attain-
ed "only by decentralisation of operations, under flexible and effective
direction and control from the center" and central control was impossible
because some functions were "rigidly assigned by lav to unwlll Ins boards
. • .
.
' In short, Reorganisation Flan Ifo* 6 of l/>3 eabodied these three
aajor changes: strengthened civilian control, inproved strategic planning,




^Matsags Accocpaaying Reorganisation Plan Bo* 6 of 1^3* Rel
to the Departaant of Defense . Coaaittoe Reprint. HOT.", 136,83rd Cong., 1st.




She Hfir|fn1 ration of lj/58
3y lj$Q President Kl eenhmwii' recognised the need lor expediting and
etwmgthenlng the unification process, largely because of the pressures
generated in the defame establishment, the psychological setback by the
successful Inunch— of Russian Sputniks, and the suver-endlng lnterservioa
bickering. In his Defease Eeorganisatioa Hassags in april 1J5&, President
Sisenhover declared that separate ground, oeu, and air warfare were gone
forever, and that the next war would involve all services in a concentrated
effort* Be felt that strategic and tactical planning Bust be unified, and
combat forces oust be organised into "truly unified cosmanrtn; that forces
oust be equipped with the aoet efficient veapono scienee could develop; and
oust be "singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of
•" And, finally, "all doubts as to the full authority of the Secre-
tary of Defease" had to be settled once and for all*
The Act wug aieMrinrt to provide the Secretary of Defense further
increased authority and responsibilities, especially with regard to the
operational direction of the Arasd Forces and in the research and develop*
2
sjssjfe sjfjfe The Secretary of Defense was given greater latitude in trans-
ferring, reassigning, or abolishing the statutory functions of the three
services* The Act specified that each military department would be "separ-
ately oncanised" under its own secretary. «jrf that each WflMlrt function under
''direction, authority and central" of the Secretary of Defense* She
"separately administered" was finally deleted*
jfsssage from thfr President of the United States. Transnlt'Miig
ea Relative to Our Satire Defense Set^qiahmmit,, P$th OonsTTad
./HA. 360, i^,pp;i-2. —
WsanisaUon Plan 1 o^
*»»*^a»»a»^JS»W»Wi*^»»^*i*»»*>M**^W*«*»»**Syw***ap*»*w n wa»**j»**Mw*<PM»w»>i»J*»aS*i*w^S^p*M^***SI»>iiii*»ji^^*Mi>*^
ct of U5&, P.L. %>*, 65th Cong., Aug. 0/

18
i loo the military departments, which had boon acting ao executive
la the operational contra! of the unified and specified cnsmnnrtn,
were taken out of the coaaaad eiioin, oo that tho line of ormnunA now runs
from the President to the Secretary of Defense thvou{jh the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to the unified end specified coomands. s a result of this enlarged
function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff was increased to kOO
officers from the previous ceilings of 210. A now post of Director, Defease
Research and Engineering was created, not only to supervise research and
development activities but to direct and control these activities.
Aasvaisal
Upon examination of the above development of defense rwrapMBt iff^ rtHP
,
it any be conclmlftd that major organization issues end conflicts among the
military services since World War II can be narrowed down to the problem of
giving each service its appropriate share of the defense budget. oarly
as 1.A7, when President Truman recommended passage of the national Security
ct, he envisioned that strategy, program, end budget are all aspects of
2
the sane basic decisions,' but full realisation in defense management tool..
a long tixae.
/mother aspect of the problem would be in terms of power structure
iBWMYj the top hierarchies in various components *nft levels in the defense
flanmftnli^t-1<*n -t **ft^ heart of the problem can be frfrliVHI down to the question
of authority in the defense management. In prc/ious sections it was pointed
'''Ibid.
qgiwiKl Mhsswcs to the Comgress Beromaending the fcfA>%'*'***i"i*,nt of
DmmM'UMut of Satloaal Defoime, December 1^, 1^^Public Papers of the "
widentS| Barry S. Truman, 1>^ (tfashlnctont uTs. Government Printing
ee, l^ul), p. 5**6.

out that, starting with the decentralized concept in 1^7, the trend has
boon toward centralized philosophy of iiFinsflSsesi relying heavily on the
decision of the Secretary of Defense* His results hove been greater and
stronger civilian control over military agencies in anticipation of balanced
military policy and improved management of the defense establishment.
03wse trends seen to be natural vhen (Wense maiiagSMent is viewed
in the ll^dit of Ian ens 1m, ^v^iyl^rltlm end subtleties in the national
security problem of today, Bow concepts of war and revolutionised strategy,
Hie loss lead tins* sad enormous costs of modern stummi and sunDortlne
system, the rapid rate of technological advances, mounting threats of po-
tential snsnies coupled with the political, economic and social aspects of
war or peace, as well as the public attitudes toward war, ailitary organisa-
tions, and the government—these and other factors have contributed towards
w/>^^g national security ^m^aVww more difficult «nfl conplicated than ever
before. la turn, these environmental settings seen to reeuire more con*
tralized dawlsiowHWriclng in the top management of the Defense Department
am the basis of rational and logical calculations and in terms of the
Integrated polltico-xailitary policy of the nation.
Despite the nany significant Inprovsjsents In the financial "nTTiQff
•HwwWJnW wSSj^B^^p 4M ^SwW w^V^S*^^wwvP^W iw^wzH^SwW* WJw#SVt wi#SMpwaMSiBHM VrwwSU^ vBjSW ^'Srfw wRISwMtw*' VWp
Title 17 of the national Security Act - jsendment in Xjhj, not until 1961, when
the team of MeHmsira and Bitch innovated and Iwplmssiitiirt a radically new
management tool-—planning and budgeting throu^ prQgramslng*-^was the full
Integration of military activities realized and real unification of the
/eased Forces achieved. In the words of one of its architects, Charles J.
Hitch:
Umn
I imply no disrespect to the predecessors of the
Secretary of Defense when X say that although, we have now ted
unification "1a none" far almost eighteen yours, there
little unification in fact' until ljd, except in three
i:
(1) Unified mnmnrtn had been created in oil overseas
theatres and for continental air defense* • • .
(2) Joint contingency plans for the use of existing
forces had been prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for
any contingencies. . . .
(3) Finally, the civilian secretaries had taken control
of the over-all level of the defense budget and brought it
into line with the fiscal policy of the administration. The
urinary method of so brlnctine the flsfansffl bud/got into 1 uY
used by all Secretaries before the present incumbent, was to
divide a total defense budget cellinE "fff rm the three Military
j> ! i . h i ii iii i ni iw iiwiwi l * i i n .mi III ii nrtfcii i mii m il Wt mr* wm iirMl i n m iifc inn n h i ,
.
' " " ' i^ " '
departments , leaving to each department ." . . the allocation
of its ceiling among its own functions, units, and activities*
3he Defense Secretaries used this method because they lacked
the imnogeoont techniques needed to "do :
[tjyerl2iiis adnenTT^
—sat
la the following chapters the ideas behind the new planning, pro-





COBCHTU\L FfeOfiftJORK OP FROGRH
Development of Performance
As described in the preceding chapter, the idea of a performance
was adopted in Hjfcg Tor the defense budget as i irn—iiilml by the first
Hoover Commission. In subsequent years this vas approached largely by re-
classifying the budget structure. Consequently, efforts centered around re-
arrangements of appropriation titles as the first step in implementing a per-
formance budget in the Defense Department. 2his was an effort to provide a
better review on the basis of broad programs or areas of effort, to place
the entire cost of a program within a single appropriation, where possible,
and to align funding responsibility with management responsibilities.
By 1951 the £fevy had drastically reduced its appropriation titles
from 52 to 21, the Army from 21 to 8, and the ir Force provided j appropria-
tion titles. However, the conceptual basis of the appropriation structure
among the services was quite different. The Navy based its appropriation on
the organizational structure existing at that time, namely the bureau system
rather than the programmatic or functional basis* Classifications in the
Force, in general, were broader in definition and fewer In number and tended
to segregate capital costs from operating costs. In l>i>o, the Defense
department of the Davy, Bureau of Baval Personnel, Financial rtJia^e-




Department established a classification of "Budget Categories" In order to
services. They were: (l) Military Personnel Costa, (2) Maintenance and
Opcru.tJ.on, (3) Major Procurement and Production Costs, (b) /acquisition and
Construction of Real Property, ($) Research and Development, (6) Industrial
Mobilisation, and (7) Establishment-vide . ctivities.
1
The present budget structure in the military departments is ouch
are streamlined and standardised than the previous structure. It classi-
fies the budget into five major categories such as:
I. Military Personnel
II* Operations and Maintenance
HI. Procurement
IV. Research, Development, lest
Evaluation
V. Military Construction.2
There had been many significant improvements In financial manage-
smnt In the Defense Department besides the sirplificatlon and modernisation
of the appropriation structure since the implementation of Title IV of the
national Security ct of 1^7, as amended. ;mong the accompllsbments were
the establishment of the comptroller organisation throughout the services,
consumer funding and the use of stock funds, increased emphasis on budget
Justification, and review and establishment of and improvements in financial
accounting for materiel inventories. 3
xIbld
., p. 87.
department of the Ifcvy, Office of Comptroller, Budget Digest for FY
1^, a VBX3Q6 P-1355, 1^5), PP. 38-73. ~~
%enate, Subcomaittee on national Policy Machinery, Hearings, Oraanls-
HatlonaT
1st Seas., 1^61
lag for n i l Security, the Budget and the Policy Process, 87th Cong.,
"., p. 100>.
'•<v,.'- BmmAi "
Obese achievements are largely credited to the first Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) , Wilfred J* McNeil, vbo served more than
ten years in that capacity, until November 1, 19£9« During his tenure he
played a very significant role in defense policy and exercised considerable
control over the services which were considered at that time to be beyond
1
the customary responsibilities of conptrollership*
Concept of Program Budgeting
The term "program budgeting" has different meunings for different
• Roland McKean and i-tel/ln JMhen, in their writing, have this to say:
To some it suggests no more than a restructuring of
budget exhibits, accumulating costs in more meaningful
categories* • • •
To other people, a program budget Implies a budget
that employs a longer time horizon than is commonly
found in the present . • • budget with its forward pro-
jections limited to one year. • • •
To still others, the concept of program budgeting
includes, in addition, the use of cost-utility analysis,
a logical and measuring relation of inputs to outputs. • •
Finally, there ore those who understand the term to
Imply all the foregoing plus one significant addition
—
arrangements for enforcing the allocative decisions
through appropriate Implementation provisions. • • .
• • • • The program budgeting concept . . . embraces
all four of the items listed above* In other words we are
interested in the organilatlom of information for decision
making, and our view of decision making is one that con-
tinues through implementatlon.2 [Underlining added.}
, PP. 305-3<X.
Poland N. McKean and ifeivin ^nshen, I bleep. Limitations, and Riski
>6ram Budget, Meaoraa
Rand Corporation, l£o>Jj P- 2.







mProgram budgeting in this sense is an entirely new concept, quite
different from the perfomaace budget concept even though they have been used
interchangeably. McKeaa ana . nshen demonstrate that the earlier concept of
a pexfoxnance budget should be properly classified under the first category
of their definition. Its main concern is to realign and simplify the appro-
priation structure in lino with functions. rthur Smithies, in his writing
el aims that from the point of view of relating to national strategy, the re-
arrangement of the budget structure has little apparent advantage over the
1
old one.
Onus, the new concept of program budgeting, defined above by McKenn
and ushen, is the "real" performance-type budget, a long-sought goal since
its original conception in the Report of the Txift Commission of i>12, balanc-
ing resource allocation to benefits by relating cost input with the output
benefits, utilities or performances over a longer period of time. Ibis
concept provided top defense management with the means to achieve "real"
unification of military activities.
Deficlencies in the Prior System
Prior to l$6X the Defense Secretaries had to resort to the so-called
traditional "budget ceiling1' approach. After the President set the total
levels of defense eaqpenditures, the Secretary of Defense would allocate them
among the three military departments on a somewhat arbitrary basis. Xn turn,
each military department would distribute the allocated ceiling among the
functions, units, and activities. If it exceeded the approved ceiling, an
artHftiifhir? budget would be presented. / 11 the budget submissions were then
•rthur Smithies, "Conceptual Framework for the Program Budget,"
Budgeting, ed. David Ifovlck (Washington: U. S. Government Printing
Office, ljb$), p.

reviewed concurrently by too Office of the Secretary of Defense to reach a
1
hnlance which oftentimes experienced severe difficulties. This review
often una done in a hectic and hurried manner and crammed into a fev weeks
during the annual budget review.
In this practice of budget-making it wee not surprising that varloua
shrewd and ingenious techniques were eaployed to got sore of a share of the
total defense budget. One of the outstanding procedures of a department
was to overemphasise and give overriding priorities to its own unique mis-
sions to the detriment of overall or Joint missions* .mother maneuver was
to strive to lay groundwork for an increased share in future years by us:
various techniques such as the 'foot in the door," "thin edge of the wed*.
2
'one-year-at-a-time, " etc. Lack of rational analysis tended to mate it
common among the services to appeal directly to the Congress, and not in-
frequently to resort to muss communication media to publicise the isi
involved against unfavorable decisions.
*yiy» most outstanding defect in the old system was the almost
piste separation between military planning and budgeting. Mr* Hitch nrmlyses
the lack of integration bctwoea the two as follows.
1. • • • the planning [was performed] by the military
planners and budgeting [was prepared] by the civilian Secre-
taries and the comptroller organization.
2. Budget control was exercised by the Secretary of
Defease but planning remained essentially la the services.
3. Whereas the planning horizon extended four or more
years into the future, the budget was projected only one









lead time from the start of a weapon development to the equip-
ping of the forces ranged from five to ten years.i • • • •
4. Planning was performed in terms of iiiaaiono,
systems, and military unite of force©—the outputs" of the
Defense Departmentj budgeting . . . was done in terms of
mirth "inoutfi" or intermediats nroducta aa naraonael. owera—
»• • • •
!>• Budgeting, however crudely, faced up to fiscal real-
ities. 3be planning was fiscally unrealistic ana, therefore,
of little help to the decision-ia&sr.• • • •
6. Military requirements tended to be stated, in abso-
lute terms, without reference to their costs . . • [regard-
less of the fact that] it must be considered in relation to
its cost . • . [because] military requirements are meaning-
ful only in terms of benefits to be gained 1a relation to
their cost. . . .1
mother aspect of deficiency in the old. system was inadequacy la
the types of data and Information needed for making major defense program
decisions. Mr. Hitch engrtfllnert to the members of the Senate Subcommittee
on actional Itolicy Hichinery that the financial isnMypment system must be
erne to provide the data needed by top Defense iisinnmi—wut to mate the really
crucial decisions, particularly on the major forces and weapon system
2
to carry out the principal missions of the Defense Establishment.'' a- Sim*
testified that the past Secretaries of Defense Just did not have the infor-
„3
nation they ought to have had, in the form In which they really needed it. 1
All those defects In the prior system clearly fna>lftin the critical
need Dor an Improved system and they also Imply the direction the new








Purposes and Goals of the Hew System
When Charles J. Hitch took the office of Assistant Secretary of
Defease (Comptroller) in January 1^61, he vac Immrrtlately concerned by the
missing link between planning end programming on one hand, and budgeting and
financial management on the other. Associated with this gap, he also felt,
Has a severe deficiency la the information system as a basis for making
crucial program decisions in the Defense Department. Sarly in 1961 he took
action by presenting his proposals verbally, formulating them in an Office of
the Secretary of Defense [OSD] paper in April, Issuing the instructions for
the nsv system to the military departments in May, and finally outlining the
system to the Congress on July 2^, 1961.
She fundamental purpose of the new system was to provide top
management with the information for major program decisions needed to
plish the national security objectives. The types of major decisions have
team elaborated by G. H. Fisher of the Rand Corporation as follows:
(l) Decisions as to whether weapon system X, Y, or Z
(or some combination thereof) should be chosen to perform
national security task in a future time period.
(2) Decision as to the force size of certain weapon
(support) systems, particularly where these systems are
f/y^vi
**i¥*x\+Ary god, 2jot in ti*e same military department. . . •
It Is a "Joint" question which must be viewed in the con-
text of the total strategic picture. . .
(3) la some instances, decisions regarding major opera*
tional concepts (hardness, mobility, alert capability, dis-
persal, etc.) of key weapon (support) systems and forces .2
[Underlining added. J
G. H. Fisher, TheJfew OASD (Comptroller) Pro&rax :tn&/Budgetiag




With regard to the information required by the aw system,
Mr. Hitch says:
first, he [the Secretary of Defense] seeds to leant
the alternative weapons ayten available to perffarm each
of
1
the Missions, both, "now and In the fuiure.
Second, be needs to Know the effect!vetoes of each of
systems in relation to tfip missions to be performed.
Ihird, he needs to know the cost of each of these systems
la relation to their military effectiveness ! indeed, he needs
annual operation cost.1 [Underlining added* ]
She above excerpts provide the basis for the now system and give
insight into its structure. Hhe following seven goals of the new
system vUl further the understanding of the sew system:
1- Planning oriented around major missions *
p^Mffln^Y^f fa <?«">nff op the Wsis of1 V**"^ fli ^' A^^y BrtspliPus
iflflffr cut across traditional ffrgjfmi%^tinn^! lines* rather
than on the
"
bflsis of unilateral pT^ms and priorities of
individual Services*
I. Ability to relate resource "inputs :> to military
ruts. She progressing system is designed to provide
"financial ^n^ nonfinanclal estimates of the resource
lsnuta reouired over tlae in order to obtain snscified
military outputs.
Budgets and funding decisions must be cocpatiule with long*
range prooraiaolng decisions. Budgeting will continue to
involve close scrutiny of detailed resource requirements
needed during the relatively short-range budgeting period,
but any decisions made at this stags #*y»VM normally be
compatible with currently approved programs.
^Department of the Savy, Office of the Comptroller, Proysm Change






k, Continuous appraisal of programs . The programming
system oust provide a means for continuous review of pro-
decisions and a mechanism for changing the programs
i need for a change is recognised. Budgeting and
funding, tied as they are to the annual appropriation cycle,
must, of course, continue on an annual basis; but this does
not in any way preclude continuous appraisal of long-range
programs.
5. Progress reporting . Control of approved programs
oust be exercised through a system of progress reports which
highlight significant deviations from approved plans so that
timely action may be taken.
6. Ability to make cost-effectlvenesB studies . The
programming system must provide a routine capability for
making cost-effectiveness studies of alternative force struc-
tures. The costing techniques used must be accurate enough
to provide a basis for comparing programs, yet at the same
time responsive enough to allow frequent studies of many
alternatives without imposing repeated, burdensome workloads
on Department of Defense personnel.
?• Integration of Department of Defense information
systems . The programming system Imposes rather heavy require-
ments for information on the Services. Other reporting systems
having similar requirements should be revised in order to avoid
duplication. Through such a process, the programming system
can play a major role in the development of an Integrated
Office of the Secretary of Defense management system.1
In summary, the new programming system has three aims: (1) To
permit analysis of total force structures for all of the services in terms
of common missions or national objectives which cut across traditional
military service boundaries; (2) to project the resource inputs or finan-
cial requirements of the proposed force structures over an extended period
of years on a continuing basis so as to reveal full cost implications; aad
(3) to introduce systematic quantitative analysis in evaluating alterna-
tives as an aid in making major program decisions. The premise here is
department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Haval Operations,
The flavy Programming Manual, Parts I and II , OPHW^OP-l, 1965, p. 1-2-2.
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that, accordi^ to Mr. Hitch, "oil military problem** are in
"in on* of their aspects, economic problems in efficient allocation and
use of resources."
It is apparent, therefore, that the structure of the new
planning, programing, budgeting system is composed of five
A program structure in terns of missions, forces
and weapons with its supporting systems.
!£he analytical cacstarisons of alternatives.
A continually updated long-range force structure
and its financial program.
Belated year-round decision-making on nev pro-
grams and changes*
Progress reporting to test the validity and ad-
ministration of the plan.2
diaries J. Bitch and Roland S. McKean, The Economics of Defease
in the fluclear Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, lJuoJV"
p. v,
HDavid Hovick, firograa Budgeting in the Bepsrtment of Defense,
), p. 10,

What is planaim? What is nropcrammlnR.; . nU. what is budgeting?
What are their relationships? David Hovlcli of the Band. Corporation, who
ugeooted "proeran budgeting" for the U. S« ir Faroe in Ifik, defines
planning es "the selection of courses of action through a systematic consid-
eration of alternatives* and proaraamlnB as the more specific determination
of the manpower, materiel and facilities necessary for accomplishing a pro-
gram. They are really aspects of the sane process, they differ only in
«1
10 be more specific, planning is the process of determining actions
sad specifying ties-phased military force requirements to accomplish a mis-
sion! whereas proBjrsnnilng is the process of translating planned military
force requirements into time-phased manpower and materiel resources re»
<*aircments; and budgeting is the process of translating muis/nwi and
material resource recrements into time-phased financial resources, that is,
2
a budget. In essence, pro&raasing is the intermediate process between
planning and budgeting.
Ibid. < p. 6.
^Department of the Hivy, Presentation Uotoo for "DQO Frogrsmn&ag
System in Department of the ftwy," Imj, p. 7*
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Programming provides the ouch needed bridge fillip the gap Litwoon
piAiming and budgeting. It is a "transformation device" between the two. It
relate* mean* to ends, end objective* to resources, In tens of de/nlopesut,
production deployment, operations of foroee or systems. Ihe Important point
1* that major decision* in the federal nanageaent have to be node in tors* of
'program,* In fact, program-decision became budget-decision and vice versa
In til* new progressing system. Ibis prooess 1* facilitated by Introducing
now concept of "major programs" ami their component*, that Is, "program
-»
Major Programs
Military activities are grouped In terms of the primary missions to
be performed ***A are represented by major programs* Similar military mi**
slon* of the service* are aggregated into broad functional classification**
such a* all-out wur, continental defense, conventional limited war, trans*
portatlon of military force* to overseas, ami supporting activities. Cur-
rently eight major programs are maintained, such as the following:
Program I. Strategic Retaliatory gore** ; the force* that
are designed to carry out the long-range strategic
mission and to carry the main ssVtM of battle in
general. Shsy Include the long-range bombers, the
air-to-isroumi and decoy missiles. *mfl the refuel-
Ing t&n&srsj the land-based and ffubMwri |iin lumen
strategic missiles) and the aystams for their commed
Program II. Contioentaj />lr and Missile Defense Forces : those
weapon systems, warning and communication networks
and ancillary equipment required to detect, identify,
track, ami destroy unfriendly forces approaching the
JSorth 'American Continent.
%enate Subccmwlttee, Bearing*, p. 130 .

S3
Pragma III. Oeneral Purpose Forces ; the forces rolled upon
to perform the entire range of combat operations
short of ijonoral nuclear war* Tbeea include most
of the .onv'e combat end combat support units,
virtually all ifcvy units, all Marine Corps units,
and the tactical units of the . Ir
IV. Airlift and Seallft yorees j those airlift and
oealift forces required to move troops and cargo
prosptly to wherever they ml^nt be needed. In-
cluded In the airlift forces are both the IttfB
transports and the Air Force Tactical Air fftmwanrt
troop carrier aircraft. She seallft forces In-
clude the troop ships, cargo ships, and tankers
operated by the J6TS and the "lbs-ward floating
V.
VII.
training, and administration of the Reserve and
Satlonol Guard personnel of the several aervl
nesciorrh and Developaent : all research and de-
velopoant effort not directly Identified with ele*
nsnts of other programs I.e., where there has been
no decision to produce for inventory.
general Support ; support activities of the several
services una the agencies which serve the entire
Department of Defense. It constitutes an "all-
other" or residual category of activities or pro-
gress and Includes all costs not capable of being




VIII. Military ooistancc :
related services provided for
m^H^s, and friendly nations.-
To recapitulate, major prograns out across the entire
lishnsnt without regard to military service or agency, program
aggregated into a major program either complement each other or are close
substitutes which should be considered together in making major program
Tfovick, pp. 13-14,
has been dropped from the
*&> Civil Defense, is omitted sines it
list.

decisions, and all major programs taken together constitute the complete
Major program are subdivided into program elaaents. The program
nlBMilt. is the smallest unit of military output controlled at the Deport-
of Defense level* Program element is rtnflnsd as 'integrated mrtitas^
tions of men, equipment and installations vhooe effectiveness ""wiTtif be re-
luted to the national security objectives. Ttnm they are the forces
,
seapace or support systeras, and similar types of integrated activities by
ssas of «hich the fdffrfflwp are ^yi^yfffltshftfl t Qftoa-cited examples are
the D-52 bomber force, POLAfUBS fleet Ballistic Missile System, missile
battalions, recruit training, the feaned Orbiting Laboratory dsvelepment
project, etc*, together with *tX\. of the supplies, weapons sad mfufjinwr Twvntkfili
to males them militarily effective. To illustrate, the program element eon*
following:



















D. ammmad Control, ttmsMnlcations as* Sugort
&C Control System (V
races (Mc-135/B-Vir)
DBF Shmrsancv Rochet ft—M**««t<«w System
Dos* Operation Support
/advanced Flying and Missile Training
headquarters and flomBftna' Support1
There ere about 1000 program elements la the total defease establish-
neat of which the Bbvy and Marias Corps have 3** program elements. She
program element la Important elace it is a basic building block of the pro-
gramming system* Every defease activity in the Department of Defease falls
within oas of the program elements, la essence, a program element represents
a veil-defined, homogeneous aggregation of military activity; the very pur*
pose of the program *>i«fri ii t. structure is to segregate these units east mean-
ingfully anA conveniently for top-level deri a tfia-mRhinc XI program ele-
immts tflHifn together sake up the conpleto defense ssli^'Mi'^W"*'- -
Five Tear Force Structure and
financial KUa (FXFB&FF)
She eulBination of the programming system is reached in the Five Year
Force Structure and Financial Plan. It is the foundation of the new system
sad basically is the summary of all approved nmrmuei far the Dsasrassnt of




Sspsrtment of the flavy. Presentation flutes for *DGD Programming. • ,'

"MntHmy fnp DrOKTSMdmR BUIMIM OB "^ "* CODDOOQIXtS flf the DOfDOrtattlt* It
projecto the forces for eight yoora and the remainder of program resources
levels for five years into the future. For full cost implications, five
years seem to be isesciwliln in terns of time-span because that period Is short
enough to make possible reasonably accurate estimates sat long enough to pro-
vide a realistic approximation of the full cost.
All of the program data, together with a description of the forces,
their tasks and missions, procurement lists, facility lists, and so forth,
constitute the Five Year Force Structure and Financial Flan. In testimony
befouim a Senate subcommittee. Mr. Hitch eaoslainsdz
• • • as each year goes by we will project our requirements
sad program* forward another year so that at all times we will
be looking at least 5 years beyond the current budget year*
Sous the Department of Defense will have at all times tentatively
approved programs, fully coated, and projected at least 5 years
into the future, to serve as a planning guide to the entire
IStilYlil I alii if lit f*
Program Change Control System
It will be recognized from the outset that this total "inventory" of
the entire defense establishment will become ineffective or even meaningless
unless it provides some flexibility to meet changing conditions, now develop-
msnte and new requirements at various times during the year. Obviously this
goal can be realised only through the use of acme type of a continuous re-
view process rather than by the traditional comprehensive ajnw,vA'1 require-
ments review, Consequently, a new program 10000* control system was developed
^Charles J. Hitch, 'Management of Defense Dollars, 1 ' She Federal
*countant, Vol. U, So. 4, June, 1962, 35.
te Subcommittee, gearings, p. 1009-
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to help attain this purpose* It provided for two kinds of changes, one
for the changes which exceed the established threshold., for the approval of
the Secretary of Defense in the form of Program Change Proposals, cosnonly
refeiTOd to as PCP's; the other Is for the changes below the threshold. In
this connection It should be noted that the Five Tear Program lies at the
lnn [ T of these changes. f£bus, when a change proposal Is approved by the
Secretary of Defense, the revised program becomes the new basis for easecu-
tion and control and, as a consequence, the latest approved plan always re-
flects the current best prediction of future events.
Program Change Proposals (PCP's) .—All changes to the Five Year
Jbr *» Structure and Financial Plan which go beyond the established threshold
must he submitted by the service secretaries in the form of Program Change
Proposals for the approval of the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense. PC$"s are submitted when the services desire to Introduce
new t>roi'gram elements* make major changes to existing elements, or when any
program element deviates beyond prescribed limits (thresholds) from the
schedule and costs projected when it was approved*
Thus, when the aasum»t.lans of cost and progress upon which approval
was based become significantly affected, the system automatically brings
the matter to the attention of the Secretary of Defense through "management
by exception." Program slippages, cost overruns, or failure to meet reli-
ability goals, may change the character of the program to the degree that
it is no longer the best on a cost-effectiveness basis, and reorientation or
p
cancellation nay be required.




ore authorised to approve ilMUipi to the five Year ftirce Structure and
fInunclal Plan below specific thresholds established \x# the Secretory of
>. If the cumulative affect of such changes, InoUrilng additional
> *tflwiftTff op exceeds an fetaVhl Inhofl threshold, a PCP cover-
ing "^ 1 of thnon changes must be submitted* i^»i/«f ^hptehol^l changes must
be within approved total Ohligitlonftl uthorlt*y.
gram Osage Proposal system ore several. First, it noises it possible to
asInteln at all tines as approved force sad financial plan projected over
2
a spam of five years. It provides for year-round dsclsionHsaking without
re&ird to the annual budget cycle.
Second, the submission of a PCP by a sorvico oases as the culmina-
tion of a major study which involves estimates of cost and effectiveness
Third, throu^ this system, costs are continuously related to ads*
slons and military effectiveness and as a result economy and efficiency will
be improved by welching the costs and benefits of alternatives.
IBk'M•*v^^l** 4*«Vfc^a TilM^Mf? AtMi4i!f^M ^^tf^a#aei^tfe^a^B ^*%^^a j'i Jiah%i t %um a #kt<L4 *t 4 &tw 4^#% waMM^^a^MMBfr
be Isneeaa0 s# lanaaaa aa^Hi HsttlallsMsMlMaVaaHi hmi „_..___• §
pertinent data to support them end, in turn, it permits a review and evalua-
tion by the Defense Dspefftnant agencies in the li^ht of the total defense
programs without regard to question of service Jurisdiction.
Finally, it ^ft^llltf>t<lis upward, downward, or horizontal rnswnnlfffi-






tine Five Year Program, and meantime closer coordination is facilitated
through 'TITHE* of infonaatioa among the cotqpoasnts concerned* Staff re~
viev in the Department of Defease is accelerated by designation of a coor-
dinating office for each proposal, responsibile for 'spearheading" and inte-
grating the reviev and proposing the response of the Secretary of Defense.
She coordinating office is required to inform the Secretary of diffex-ences
in oylTiifflB *wryx the participants, if soy*
Cost CategorlsB
la order to reveal full cost .npT, cations of a weapon system, the
cost most cover not only one-time costs for development, procurement and
construction of facilities* hut also the recurrinn *«^^ omeratlns costs*
She cast of essm spasms alememt Is broken down ixxto three categories,
namely, (1) research and deveJjopmeat, (2) initial investment, and (5) annual
operating costs* Shese cost categories are defined ass
raerily associated vita research and development efforts in-
cluding the development of a new or improved capability to
(2) TTVfflBtfflftnfi ** those program costs required beyond ties
development ph^gfr to introduce Into operational use a new
capability, to procure initial* additional or replacement
equipment for operational forces or to provide for major saodi-
fleatlons of an existing capability.
(3) Qprratilng • those program costs necessary to operate
and aalntaln the capability."





duoeifioatlon of costs highlights tfao laay decision potato la
the Ufa of a weapon oysteo. Because of the fieamfcfluai outlays involved In
developing a new weapon «yatosr—for aaeuqple, $£•$ billion was spent far
FOLARJ3, $1.5 billion on the KKB-SEUB, $2.3 billion on the MBAS* fe
billion for two prototypes of tbs B-70, etc.—a dotaraination to go abssd
with fullscala developcsnt la itself is a aajor decision. It is also obvious
that, before initiating production ana depleysisnt, It is necessary to fcnow
the lnvestavnt costs of a veapon* oyatec, which often involve billions of
dollars. Finally, information oust be available on the cost of operatise
tilt proposed forces each year. Is aaay eases, far exaaf&e a h-52 via^, the
five-year operating costs are about equal to the initial eeuipssnt costs,
1
Xj: MB VNV MM Setaslly | : .^.;:i*j;-.' thSjB. tM Isatdsl IflWS^hMK NM"Jh
Costs are asasured in terns of "total oali^ational authority
the soount required to finance the program elemot in a given year, ragard-
locs of when the funds are afproyriated by the Congress, obligated, placed
on contract, or spent, w eawts ox seen progress eiaosst Are uro&en oovn
by various budget appropriation accousts in order to facilitate the mjavem
2
and Oonstruction ..*&»&*»©
lti»ou^i la top-level programing, primry eaphasls is placed on
pMHMI ^"Uaaeaton ., a^tMSttfaMI ftffeen. Nfltea wherv- #JMi|Etesj| MM MUMl ito-'
specific resource inputs ^frUffo are in a significant degree lirf-i^ffifl^'i '- of




decisions, such as a decision with regard to the
of a two and one-half ton truck. frbreover, even la cases where
decisions are not called for at the Office of the Secretary of
level j a need exists for expressing program element decisions in
of their implied resource requirements* Shis permits explicit planning
for the acquisition cad financing of resources, provides a convenient link
with budgets* and affords a means of sift sfti|iii lit control of programs. Bo-
source inputs are defined in terns of "resource categories.
A resource category is either a unique type of resource or homo-
geneous grouping of related resources. Every resource input falls within
one of the categories, so that the sum of all resource categories equals the
total Defense Departaent resource requirements. B>ere are four major types
of resource categories s Items of equipment, military construction, manpower*
and functions and activities financed under the Operations and Maintenance
ajniropriatioas. Whenever possilxLe, resource categories are measured in
both financial and nonflttsneiAX terns*
Resource esteeories ere now listed in tes sememes to the Five Hear
Force Structure and Financial ELan, a Materiel Annex and a Construction
3 .be former is a listing and collection of data sheets for the more
procurement line items and is crwpfrsed of two parts. Bart I is a
JLine-itwa "shopping list ftforyjlyig the quantity and cost of all procurement
line items that exceed $8 million in one yearj it covers the current year,
huiasa year ^nfl the four «***»»«* *** fiscal years. &art II. sometimes ^nl H ^Hl




the noan Dictionary, ia a caUectloa of data nfrnrrtu shies, *"*—*»*«»»
descrlstlve infaraatiea and data on nroduction raaulxsttHKta* iiufstttaanr.
cost and operations fa* a particular line iteau
2he Construction i'lcwx shows approved construction projects i'or the
current year, the budget year, -nail Dour easui^ fiscal years* It pftfftwlne
descriptive infenoRtien* cost data, ana sctoduiad dates*
Since the sua of till program elements constitutes the total aiiitary
output and the sun of all resource categories equale tie total resource
Input, these two cUnensioaa provide different slices of the save basic over-
all defense ptrograaBu B&itber diskxj&ioa. aIp^;- r ives pufffldect InfbKnatlon
for all Office of the Secretary of Defense pUt.n1,re exsl control* Whereas,
both taken together provide a coqplete picture of ti» sources and uses of
resources shock the various defease activities*
^•BAd., PP. X-3-fc# 1-3-5*

compter IV
OPERATION Of SHE SXSSOI
As its same implies, the pianolas, progi'nmsli^, and budgeting system
operates in three phases: (1) military plaminc aad requirement deteimina-
tionj (2) fbrnulAtion and review of the programs, and (3) development of
annual budget estimates. To visualise the system in use, the operation of
each phase will be outlined. 23se first two phases—plannlng and programming
conducted on a continuing year-round basis, while budgeting involves a
operation coinciding with the federal budget cycle.
Phase 1. Military Planning and
masm! -i-i^awti BsjtanritawnHi
As defined in the preceding chapter, planning is th<? process of
determining actions and specifying time-phased military farce requireousntw
to accomplish a mission* la the new system it starts with the Joint stra-
tegic Objectives Plan [JSOF] by the Joint Staffs ia the Joint Chiefs of Staff
with help from the respective planning groups in the Military departments.
However, they are not Merely retirements studies in the traditional
•easel rather, they are military economic studies which compare alternative
ways of accomplishing national security objectives. Shey try to determine
the dan that accomDlishss Hut mssrt far a Ativan cost or achieves a eivsn
x
objective at the least cost. These are essentially 'cost-effectiveness




studies" op systems analyses vb^h vULl bo doorj ITwtf In the fallowing
chapter. It is inportant to note that the tanrtnncy to state rrtlitary rcsquire-
msbbb In absolute tami has been dlscouraeed aincs» la reality* resources are
always United and the alternative uses of available resource* oust bo a
Originally the re/low a? joilltary re^uLcssa&ats started In March 1^62.
ansa Secretary tt^aaara ftsalgwsft opnroxlia&tcl/ 13Q study ** ojocta to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the iallltff.iry departaan&s, and various cTnpaasnts of
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Many of these projects were coo*
corned with critical and difficult requirements problems such as the aaed
for end anabasis to be placed on strategic bonfaere and missiles, Aati-8ub»
marine Warfare [ASH], anpb£bious forces, the quality of conventlossl war
forces and how to improve taasa, the ctev-tslope*3:.t of a new tactical filter
aircraft, and so on.
Bar each year the -'Silefs of Staff have the opportunity to
reeraaarrt to the Secretary of Defeats throng the &>lat Strategic Objective
Flan 1^30?} the military forces and sc^or probleae "which they consider should
he SMBPorted over the next five to el^it years. Is tho spring of each year
the Secretary of Defense reviews these recoiaaended forces end prosrams,
ashes preliminary decisions, and provides "tentative force "uidanee" to the
military departments. 2hia serves as a basis for the preparation of their
formal change proposals to the live Tear Pbcrcs Structure and Financial Flan*
The ptrlncipal "eosWlTeetiveneBS studisa" are scheduled for ccaple-
Ulon at about the same tine |l orOrsi to provide the Secretary of Defense sat
his principal advisors informafcion necessary to cape irlth the most critical
department of the Savy, Program Chance Control System. . , p. 2-2.

to
and difficult regjiireaeat probleas. Many of tte roifit i assets studios
originate with tte 3euiutftP of Defease! otters cods free tte Joist ** >•>*»
.'* s
§4 iMMMsWeaHl MM iM MM Ml RMMJMMM
Froipravadng ves defined io the unwed tun chapter as tte proemp of
translating planned military force reejulreeaatc into tlae*phased manpower
and materiel resource recall limit 11. It is a eemilauQne» ^roar-round opera-
tion la tte nov avstesu 2a this masse* tte cost and offlnc tlvcLMDiiii of alter-
native mK«^f of weapon systems to soot certain generalised requirements
within tiff framework of "bbJKmt' jECCurass"* ere a^-gyMtiniiitaft ^wii seteradaed*
9s» process of tte pscogrea rav&ar is a teem effort with participation agr tte
service secretaries* the Chtftfte of Staff and tte fuactloaal assistant secre-
taries exf Defense. In tte process of diacusaX^u, the ^T^t ^^aMons of various
ways in tfcich a war sadU^ct ftsvelgjl would be explored.
3te Five tear Force structure and Financial Hsa serves as tte only
^wi» «fc^fc\»w^^w^* ^^^B^Br^ "'"•wsp ^#ifc ^fM ^^Hp^b •*••>' v,vv4Rw ^ffS^WiW^ ^^B^mffSJ^^W 1—i^^* ^*^J/ w^fc^^W «^^^P«^fc aiF ^HAS* «f ^nS* ej^^PASJ^PSSwBmBj
1 «* X3 nXUBOXDR XOr 1 ' nttr^iSTii TM. JWBHBOSeS %n* I COBBOaSOCB OX XDtO JiezeHBSI
Departoent. As pointed out eurlJer, all prcgrcaa aye subject to nootiauous
eh&ases sad tterefore are vQdated every otter sxmth; iu tte Five Tear Pro-
araae this procedure is accomplished through tte prograa fh^fg^ control
aystam* A brief nfti/TT'j of tte procedure is lite this: Subniseion of pro-
Msi cac^i^ xi^OLKj&ALz b\ w^r< «» ^^* =u.^>' l iL -?i MM sjsJMmsI Msasl'tMMMU
ttedr review by all latarested caapoaeatsi tte 3ecretary»s decisioa oa each
^teh, PeclsioiMMlrt^ for Defease , p. 31.
2Ibia« J p, 38.

Lj anil finally, the assi&onBnt of i omioiuTMl tt^y for carrying out a
particular decision to the appropriate artlltsjy departnout or agency. Eun~
^B*^a*p^»JL*M. -- -** Ma^kM^,!^ m1.a^.«A "Ml mil I n - ^ j_iUK*f* "1 Ifc « n J—. ±1 »— it tt* ^i-gl-jj Mrijit *ja^**A s. t 1 * I fi n |- til
v«* iXXiO ci PTC| .-**•'. CmRmB I nfl HI iU OBHW DMPBH B - - - - DQ BttQB NMU pHHRl -* *
iinvolving Mil ions of dollars,
athou^ changes nay bo proposed at any tine during the year, the
zaajotrity of T*"^ntr* occur during ttao ffjirfflff**^** ia»aihs> following the """ffy*-!
viev of the Joint Strategic Objectives Hen by the Joist Chiefs of Staff.
Usually by August the Secretary of Defense renters the aajority of decisions
regarding the changes* IS approved* rftftingiTfl are conuunieated dotns#ard and
ijbs military dsoartaeacts receive tibe decicinesi about the mrottrasi ffHUrnft nso-*
pnenlri end evaluate ffiyrn; vithin ten days the iRfflpptffirltst'ft eepartrasnt suisalts
a Program Element 8usmery J?bra aotasniled&ing receipt of the authorised
changoc as veil as updating the Five tear ProScans*
Tbe Initial development of the progremntng system eomsenced in H*ty
St
jPh^^wwb^^bms ^e^p^oy ^^if ^*sine> si* ^(Pasi^^ %*t*w^fa 'tpw^ iiw^w stay • <ai^^wfc Mm^ *t^Esfb,^^^^RB& weeape •sw^ip ^^^p
w
*> wp^a**^w ^p"*» ^pw^we
defense eslffM 1shr^n* and regroup then into Mosdngfua program elements. In
addition, they had to sake program decisions that would form the basis fee
flutdaivrt to the services on the preparation of the Fiscal Year 1963 budget
advisors, of a range of alternative program in terra of cost-effectiveness.
It was at this stage that the major progress, uhicfc were originally
yw^l^iftpi ''program pac&a^cs." were fnmnlatsfl as a result of this analysis*





in ttiw of "total obligatory authority" which ara now being used
at tfttff tin© for uBdfbm usage*
review ox peraorom mo ooapjetea o& too secretary oar Dsrense on
28, 1961, oal a g»ffl.mflp lottor was issued to ton military eejart-
vhich was used oo too basis for FT 1963 budget, this program gnlaanro
tabulated the approved foixcj mid programs for f2 throutfi 1967 for each
of the progress trflottlTTr vlth uaplao&tory Tuirttrr «od pEroGoroment lists* wlsiiim
1
•
Itsves 3* DevclcMptnt of AbbmsI lat&mst j&tlsmtos
2ns third phfcafl of ttto system, ^fiflflff*"-l-n^i nes been defined as tte
of translating awe^smsjar and materiel resource reeulremants iato
financial resources* It is aayarant u*x\ in this asv system of
budfisting the budgst^vSifclflE. will consiat only of iismworMflg a
year slice of asyrovsd peo^rsm* within Um* Five Soar Programs iato an
KtalM ptfjAsmt i'-.^*-i-.w ^ ewenej i.iut; oevaii. esjSmMaVJ to Mr . Hitou^, |sj Mob
a system sot only would budget decisions be program doclsioas • • • bat pro-
orem iiafitalmMi «—"is be budget ilsrlilrmn " slnea "decisions to embark on
would be escnlicitXv decisions to nrovid© the rosoorees reoulrsd to
out."2
substitute for too ensue! budoot review* SaHvar.it is designed to orovide
a basis for ths parsparatloti of ths ATrrff1 bod08t as wall as ^aiidanos for
futui'O plasBdos*
ipsaartMnt or xos savy, ysf jrro^faa 4*apoi systssu p« z»y»
^£Ltc&< BsctstBW amMlfc- for Defeaso> p. 39.

uHaving the rive Year Programs updated at all times, the Defense
Department la able to drav up rutber quickly a detailed defense budget by
using the first increment of the approved programs, together with other
policy juldsnce, ae the basis* This makes a mxcb. sore orderly and thorough
budget preparation possible, since It would provide the tlse for greater
detailed revietr of all the factors involved In the preparation of a defease
budget such as shopping lists, production schedules, lead tine, activity





the Defense budget is prepared annually and e^ressed by appropria-
tion titles vhlch are organised is teres of i onomcis categories as anted in
chapter H« Titles are classified into five categories: Military Personnel;
Operation and M^ntenance; Procurement; Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation; and Military Construction. They are somewhat different from
the program structure. In contrast to his original thought, Mr. Hitch
recognizes a certain advantage In leaving the aM^sthrifttlop structure intact*
He asserts that the Defense Deportment oust be managed not only in program
terms but also in terms of resources in the first place; that the approprla-
tloa structure also provides neadsd flexibility for adjustment in the pro*
gram; and finally that Congress prefers the existing structure, particularly
the Appropriation Comadtteoc.
The budget covers a tferee-year period at one time: (1) Prior Tear -
the fiscal year immediately prior to the current fiscal year* It indicates
Senate Subcommittee, gaarJags* p. It
%itch, Decision-making for Defense, pp. 29-30.

how fund*, previously mmwd "by the Coocrene, wore actually utilised;
It reflects tte latest planned use of funds approved by the Congress for the
year; (3) Budget Year • the fiaaal year IsnecLLutely following current fiscal
year. It reflects the request of an agency to tee Congress for funds to
Hanaally • the wtth^*X budget sulxaissloa to the Oocretary of Defense
Is aads tkwmMtlty on 1 October* sons nine tt*^ prior to the ^y^-»«^^i*»
fiscal year* All approved prottgons that are vithin the Five Year Program
as of the ostubllilMil date ace Included in a basic budget submission* Usu-»
ally tlw Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget
analysts nates a Joint review of the budget reoueats by the Military depart-
l doi'oiiae . l. i. ^. Beeed an sueh i *iivIsm tentative bud&et decisions
1
on specific itesn or progress are made by the Secretary of Defease
decisions are transmitted to tb/» cosmonauts concerned in the for© of
"Subject/issue Papers*" nore comsonly known as "Operation Snowflaks*"
dose procedures show a n&rfeed dlffcrenco from the pro-1
wmbmwlII »Mrtam t afflwtt» (loose ') was rmw inrii If an individual
vies secretary or head of a defense agenrv disagrees with a decision* he has
the opportunity to appeal by submitting to the Secretary of Defense a pool*
tlon papal' a reclans intBiarsd by bureaus* offices end urogram esonsorc*
iter consideration by the Defense nor i alii r» of each xeclena* a final dsci-
sion Is nods* Tentative decisions "ttitowpiirl fl^lly become final if no "fly***
I
Is made* BspibI on the decision* the usual budget schedules are prepared
1
DepartBant of the Ifovy, <2k» lewy Pi <^*nsiing ItanuoX, p. 1-^-
^epartaent of the asvy« Ttm Prograg Change Control Systea, p. SO.
^pepartnent of the Hivy, The Htvy Pro^ensing Itenual, p. 1-^-5.
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art submitted to the Bureau of the Budget for inclusion in the President's
Budget, flbcsnlly the President presents bis budget requests to the Congress
soon after it convenes ia January of eeeh year*
conventional torac, and in program terns* She Secretory of
end justifies It by programs. Be has primary responsibility to
flpftfwft the flefsiwe budget as a tdiole, and ouch tVtiiftf of a program is
Justified aad defended by the cognisant eervlee department or agency* How-
ever* the Defense SUbocstsitteoc on AiiMWiariatiflWB In both Houses have not
deviated their hearings sl^nifioantly from the traditional ways.
Cost lufUnattioo System
It nuet be clearly understood that a principal 0oal of the pro*
greasing system in the Defense Department is the capability for making rapid
cost cosperisons of alternative veapon system or fares structures* In a
Senate hearing* Mr* Bitch stated explicitly the importance of cost in the
• . . Could you indicate vbat you think this
difference [between the old aad the new system]
really k
to me* One is that the costs are assembled
!aYJE9f£&S* * *
She other la that the costt.
programs $ or 6 years in advance . ." '.' .%
lUnderlining added.]
nseaate Subcccraitteo, Hearing, p. 1
^Tbid., p. 10£>.

Later in the sane testimony tie etmln emphasisod that:
paclaoo approach Is to provide this
leasts ) infarnation 83
post it has boon pro-
vided, fi-aTtiaa to tine, on the baeia of
:;;.•.: :_ ' mwmv*«« [Underlining idaed.]
Despite the need for program eleraent costs the inherent difficul-
ties involved in allocating fined costs, and, in particular, Joint costs,
deny en easy solution, tears ere due in part to the fact that there always
exist varying degrees of uncertainty which are inevitable in the developoent
of a new weapon system* these errors in estinmting costs also have been
named by overly optimistic estimates of the offo.-t required to achieve a
given result or by overlooking or ignoring significant elenents of cost*
Mr. Bitch classifies the latter as the problem of estimating the
development and production costs of new weapon systesn and he cites that in
the past tee costs have been underestimated by factors of two to ten, not
two to ten percent, but 100 to jOO percent!2 Despite the aany efforts to
iffnrove the situation 'jy establishing the Cast end Seomamic Xnforaation
Systns in the Defense Dspnrtmenfc, the Cost Information System in the ser-
vices, and constructing casputerised "cost models* '* j^^ ^^^ remains tc
done* A conplete study of the costing program is beyond the scope of this




^itcb» PeclBlnm-»mntetiy for Defense, pi
department ot the Jtovy, She Bavy ProgreisBing ttmaal, p. l<*fc-&>*




l. Um and III. StlBBS W&12, Bev* 2, July, X

It Is an axiom in iwnagaaiiit taut planning* to tie effective, abouM.
provide a aeons to aacsure actual progress against approved plans ao that
i ii'Hi"Ij^iii it oaa take corrective actions if perforaance shows significant
deviations from the established norns or standards, and more importantly to
lnltl^^/it preventive measures befare acy significant deviations occur* She
:>x>d f"v» rro^reiin NsasFtta I sa rcr.>"-:.ui hgj»tfl hsa feasji sSaafftv nt^to BV
Secretary Itefeaara:
The effective nonagsaent of approved prograas also requireo
of the progress being made in achieving established objectives
—in both physical ami flnuarial tarae on the basis of program
entities and not sorely in tares of the bits ^wfl. pic cob of pro*
Hie Defense Depnrtasnt has established a progress reporting aystea
in order to dateraine how closely the ailitary deportments are meeting the
base program in the five leer Force Structure and Financial Flan as aofti~
fied throuHU the program change procedure* It prHyyides top annagsaent is
the P#f*HiHfr Department vlth necessary infaraation on actual pfrirfywaMy? of
a prograa at a sufficiently early date so that corrective or preventive
anasarca can be initiated at the earliest pngfflM^ tlae*
A physical progress reporting system and resource category account-
ing and yqfww't'-fl iTe system have been developed in the Department of Defease*
The essential characteristics of these systems ares
inAuaual Report of ti*© Secretary of Defanse, July 1, 1^60 to June 30,
l&6Xp* Departaant of Defense, nnual Report for Tt liX£ (Washington:
U* S. Ooveracsant Printing Office, Vj2), p. 27*
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in auefeer* against entai lrlvi*^ EtLLcstooe schedules* fftyr rnrh Item* the
report above tbe raHftrvfrtnnr ecbadtOad ft* cxaa&otion Jurlng tLe current
Wjutlt aptf. during the fbilsA'liJt; 'three acastiau, uctuiiX and anticipated accent"
OCtlOfli ^atlqfflyi gjp required* Vhlt SUbcdttizXI dflfMUftdBBt Of
agency Indicate© JnpliQ&tione si* chenges la tbe mtlfetone echeenlo and la
l21 RfiftOUrce tittBOjflORF (BlAflflllfltit Itff SO& ''*MWBn*fei nw> •*•» A GQllOCtiQQ Ox
acoouatlaG intonation on recourse categories. 2fco Initial reporting
reaulrenenta are confined to the "capital acocuBt8"~HRaeearcfc. Dcvclom3nt<>
s
Sent and £vaLuatloa| £*ocureaent; or Military Construction cggcoprlatlaa.
SSS mTimImIIiii
Wurt^tt of DflfWie,Jrogseyftig Systra far .^Office of tfri
y of Defense* !#£, p. XII-3.

In the preceding chapter* it use orted fiesjueaOy that one of ttat
mjor objectives <af the progr<tts»lng ffystea is to <fet-erx"saloe the vays that
acofc-ibute nost tor * given cost or achieve * given objective for the least
cost in acceqplishin^ national security obJetri*ive» ty c**|?aring a range of
alternative Also it 8** minted out t&at the coct-eif^jLlveneos analysis
or systesa analysis has been *«cfcensivaly utilised in -&*» £iret two ghstsu of
progr«» budgeting: (1) the cteteminatioa ttf aaHtiay i-eq^-ojaeats, and
4 review m/ft antuysis cct pirtgraos and prc^^** eiieMsnts* "Vfalg chapter
will describe briefly the concept of this (approach and its implications for
dfttonse probxea-solvinc;.
Vla&t 2d (tast-Effbctiveness Affflgi
JB&sentlally, cost-eftecftlveaess analysis BT sysiaa analysis in
defense proodens is used to soever the fclXcsrins ^ucsticas; l!hat strategy,
force or weapon systase offers the greatest siaouat of military effectiveness
for a given* ontlsvt ftfj .looking at tfca problaei f 2*&1*# bow *
given level of military effectiveness can be achieved Hi the leeSt cost*
3%e*e decisions cannot be delegated ts budgstecrs asS c^:qptrc&ldrs, since,
baeic&Lly, strategies are the vays of using resources or budget* to achieve
nlXltary objective*, ©sese decisions are the prizsa reopcvitlMllties Of top
trtftNN

Q. U. Fisher bos listed the a&Jor characteristics of cost-
(i) A moot £undaaentul characteristic is the
ss&netlon and comparison of alterntti
which at.
.
tolaua to achieve specified objectives for
future tine period.
(2) Critical ewnlnut&au of alternatives typically involves
wnpLp i n^m tfnqw It^pyf^t jj,Qffljy j ljut the tSO SJL
nent of the cost and tbo benefits or utilities pertaining
to each of the alternatives being censored to attain the
(3) She tins context is the future--often the distinct future
of five, tea or wire /ours.
one of uncertainty—yery often great uueortalnty*
(>) Usually the context in uhieh the tiiMvtjBlw takes place is
fairly breed (often vejy brood) end
conplex vith nuMHraus interactions ffflflwfci the Isey vari-
es in the probUn*
While quantitative aetucds of analysis gHtttlfl ye utilised
as such as possible, because of items ( .) and {}), purely
quantitative nock met often be heavily s%gp1flii»»tsd ay
Qualitative analysis*
(7) Usually the focus is on research and developnent and/or
invesfsnnt-typc decision preblees, althju$* operational
decisions are smflnfrjaas encountered.
(&) SlBBliness is isBortant* A careful, thorough analysis
1 tinelA^ofr coaoe six aonths after the critical of flit—Iffion
any be north essentially zero, while a less thorou^o^but
thouchtfully done—analysis consisted on tino any be worth
a great deal.1
Prinary Purpose of the nelysis
It should be stressed that the prinary purpose of the cost-effective*
nose analysis is to assist the iTiimlilmii mlim in suoh a say that his
*G. H. Fisher, "She Hole of Cost-Utility Analysis in Program Budget-
MBBoronduo BJ**4l?>-EC (Santa Monica, Califs 2he Band Corporation,

Intuition and Jiidyeiiit are oettar than they would 1m without the results
of the analysis* Thus* the outcome of the analysis will not take the placo
oe* ojonlilfii eilrliejj rather it will abwrpsn toe intuition and Jud^otnt of the
iHlejiMMHiMr* tssrtteamsa It sMli el ejejeJMeil tfeet sti, t Hal
I
of aiMkreeoiik '' of .tufcaeont near on ooeeelnm have a hisd! nav-off.
short, 'quantified cownon sense io Tallin iter on the pert of analysts.
Significance of CooVEffoctiveaooo amlyais
Sbe fact that reeourceo are always Unltort io contrast to unsatlat-
able noeda and wants in every homo endeavor calls for an econooio choice
from available alternatives In order to have a rational decision. She 'basic
idea behind coat-effectiveness analysis is that Just as a private fina
to obtain iwartnm profit out of the least cost, so the problem of
net . earn tmanefel mf as Ike evesnea' of sal atfm Hal snrsii ef ftaflamai
products or outputs against their costs* Evaluation of dofense amending in
terns of costs and benefits Is more difficult than that of private business*
since there is no price teg attached to defense outputs consequently no
profit criterion can be established.
However . ejejAejenfeai atxi ojensjttloMaoj anelaMMei set aefeixw omejetl»»*"'^»'»™ ^»r w ^p^»» Wf^ » »r w^*»»>*»"»""* ^^•v"*' -•*) ->jaw** «>>* W"»w >*« »7 ^»» **MW*a«>^Ba>mf •j»»c^pib»j»' *•»'•» ^"•b ^•Bar ^b> bjb»-jbb*^b»«bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbjj«
are more laportant than business outlay beoauoo of their fnr*reachlng Icyaot
on the economic, political, and social aspects of the nation. One of the
problems In <Hi?lsl'?ft~ratlr1nc •&£* defease la the vast array of alternatives
among which decisions are to be node; another is the fact that there are
may diversified end cocfilmc relevant factors involved in those decision
*Xbld * * P*>» 9
<%itch, Declaion«im&lni» for Defease, p.

ft
To soma degree this quantitative approach serves to mltl^at© interservloe
to entail everlasting mr&mmte without & sound -aaio. Xa addition, this
new approach baa Irrtp-fl si<jnijFicenfcly to reorient traditional military
thinking to a new and. more systematic way.
History i cumin many examples when ttie cheaper and *iHfrfif "e^lly less
efficient weapon proved to be the "best" sloply beeauee its lower cost made
"quality" appeared to havo decisive effects* 2hus it would be reasonable to
mssuae that historically the prmrtuliun swings back aad forth between cuaatit^
and quality, and neither cost nor effectiveness alone la a sufficient basis
upon which to choose 1 weapon system. Both factors must be considered slaul*
taneously and la relation to each other*
She cos1>effectlveness studies are useful for another kind of <tJlf^fw*
problasi--the question of "how amen is enough?" In this sort of problem, the
destroy /I percent of the 100 targets?" but also, tJls the capability to roiae
expected target destruction from jA to >7 percent worth the cost of 100 extra
missiles?" m other words* examination oust be aada not only of total eosta
iBpft total products but also mxrjinal costs and wurjilnnl benefits » or marginal
i
iv*r»*-M4w«fc<rt«i>M *jvf>t'i«< be analyzed*
All these probloca Involve the choosing of doctrines* weapons and





asatlslils resources or to achieve a given level of defenso at the least
cost- However, it auot ue stressed that if the objectives, or the caste,
or the ssssm snaute of ztiMUuy effectiveness are wrong* the nnswsiw. aleo
ere wrong* A good eacssplc is tee ease of toe y*yyilllP air-to-ground sdsslle*
Organisations for Syeteae Analysis
In tee Defense Dspartaent* tea Office of tea Deputy Assistant
secretary of Defease (System Analysis) has the responsibility of raising
the quality of analysis throux^out the Dspextrasnt* to see that studies ra»
uussUrt by the Secretary are responsive to hie asses , to review studies for
the Secretary and, share necessary, to do or vo-do studies. Oa the other
hand, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the service flrtfnitBsnti oav8 a9ea *oe
oystess) analysis and have established a foam of OKganisation to deal vritL
th is problem* for example, the Hnvy office of fftegran Appraisal is charysd
with the system anaXysis studlus involving the Savy and the Marine Corps*
In fuV^^Vrcr to those "in house" capabilities, the Defense Depart*
asst also supports a nutiber of outside groups such as the Air force's BA9D
Cosperatloa, the Axsor's nosoarea and Analysis Coiporatioa, the asvy*e Center
for Hevul Analyses, and the Defense Dspnrtsss*t's Institute for Defense
Analysis* Shase outside supporting groups provide detached views and are
able to approach a problem with relatively \inhisa<WI and objective attitudes*
Xt ffhotuld be pointed out also that these arrasgsnanfes provide the broadest
2
--« •--'
-ji^A*Oiltje lXJLiT)Gilt?ii v*} '
1
Xbi&*» pp* >2, 55-

Major CfrTfjft^HiTifrtVying in Caot~
lis^l£fectiveness Analys
At the current stage of dcvuJLjpwent of analytical nothods it* la not
, .3 -..•/. ._; ••,.'••.,VI^^VWNMIV "J^^T ^^^V*9 9B^> ™*» »*?«W»*» " •"• ^*^P *P^»^W ^*^m ** •WM^*' «»»»•») ».** " ••»•» ^^»»^*»*W»*»»™r*»» W ^^M»» ^^vj^W
^*5Bi^ *^**»»»» — —
analysis, tut sone iqportant gui/^lnes, princ^tiw and .OlustraUons as*
jfinim ntil briefly in the fullovlng paragraphs:
(1) Proper structuring of the problem ie e>Li-»:i£|?ortent» ISbo fftiTV^ytflff
fl M ^*j**_g_*« .. ... - , : - MMAJflMP.
the utTT^wpl lefuwit of & given objective,, the cLLtometivQs any be coopered en.
the Vitilift of their estimated ecanonlc reeponse inpuct; or, for a given lu&gst
level, the alternatives nay be coopered on the bmrta of their estlasted
utility «*» forner is the FiaoA (/tiUty Appgcaeh sod the latter is the
(3) It is usually accessary to construct a nudel, either fortial or
ixtfornal* to be used in the analytical procese. fiere the naln purpose is to
develop a set of relationships among objectives, the relevant alternatives
available for attaining ths objectives, the ostinatad cost of the alterna-
tives, and the estimated utility for each of the alternatives.
(4-) Uncertainty rust be faced explicitly in the analysis* Sensitiv-
ity Analysis . CoatJaM—er Analysis, and a fortiori Analysis are three possible
technique© that nay be used in dealing with the problem of uncertainty*
2h sensitivity analysis several values (high. mflfUma. and low) for
than the rssulta are analysed.
^tOkia section is largely based on a. B. Fisher, iTQie Role of Cost*
Utility Analysis in Frobleu Budgeting," Pro^m BuAigytlaa
.
ad* David Itovlck,
Part X, chap* 2.

00
analysis investigates how the ranting of the iltannr
tivas under consideration boLds up when a relevant change in criterion for
... ~i
Fortiori analysis involves an analysis of X vereun Y, where Intui-
tive Judfiavnt strongly flavors 2, and the analyst nay choose deliberate^;
thane adverse conditions. If X still turns out to be better than X, the
...
analyst has a very strong ease in flavor of *•"
(5) Although It cQBpllcates the analysis because of an tncrease In
the nuriber of variables, /tay often tiB9~phas£ag of the iapasta of the
various alternatives Is a re^gulrene&t* Xf the fHf^itffl^t* makers are not i&-
different with ressect to wise isrefereaces* the estinetes of tirae-ahased isa~
pacts nust be "equalised over tlae through the use of "discounting"
abba to do scne validity cbecklag of the analytical procedure, e»g., can
the nodal describe known facte and situations reasonably veil?
(?) While caeVuftLUty analysis stresses the use of Quantitative
aathodsj the analyst | aot hesitate to su^snent his quantitative work
with appropriate qualitative analysis.
Appraisal Prolans* end lAs&tatlano of the Gyntea
2hus It is clear that the Secretary of Defease and his principal
advisors; both civilian and adHtary , have been provided a highly effective




pru^em and of eeeeuring psiifrraamas. of approved pco&refls) thereby iihiii Hi*
in* control. In Jdditioa, tfeey are able to xxxiify, add to or delete toe
pubises aa aaado ariae through the program chance control systeti. Mora*
over, budgets are la balance with program*, pac^i-cas with force requireaanta,
force reonlramenta with aUltary missions, and military missions vith
national security objectives. Barttcularly lamortaat ia the fact that de-
cisions are realistic and feasible* an effoct, the total budget dollars re-
quired by a plan for the fixture do not mnrcjarrt the Secretary's responsible
i
oplnlnn of what le necessary and feasible."
for the first tine ia the history of defense of the United States,
the Secretary of Defense la able to carry out his vast responsibilities by
cassrctaing full "direction, authority, and control over the Department of
Defense, " aa envisioned by the actional Security Act of 19*»7 through tha
planning* pioaiearning, and budgeting system. I*y careful separation of the
budget process from progressing this baa bean done without prior eongres-
atonal approval, a stringent roadblock for budgetary reforms in the past.
Defense Secretary McHaaara has described the functions of the
It is through this system that we look at the
effort as a whole. H&Jor program priorities can be meanlng-
fully dcteradaed only in terns of tha total program* and a
p&'oper balancing of all the elements of th& c '"jfense effort
can ably be achieved at the Departaent of Defense level.• • a •
Vhllfl* Z believe that unified planning, programming, and
declainawaaking are indispensable to tha effective tmrnganant
of the defense effort, I aa equally convinced that the actual
^tcu, Declalrsi aaHnc for Defense, p.

£of the pnograa #vmM be aeaeosd, to the
\m the fWMWftmiitffn sod naasasasat of the Pefainht
at aust bo based on the aria
m ami teGetxtraXixad «»mtiftn
Mi e le p nciples of centralised
ill til 1
budgeting ayatea le not a panams It le not sonetbiag
that caa be easily designed, readily installed, or promptly effective in
operation* it nee certain xiaxtatiooe ana prcui&as sone ox vxu.cn nay a©
overeoHS or adnlndaed through careful eaeelaatlon a»i*& lapleaantetion of the
systenej otters any not be so easily euraounfcocU Soaa of the problem areas
bjm
(X) Program structure cannot eXueys be defined in a clear-cut aanr
oar* She currant program structure nsatly classlfSas and accommodates the
activities of the Air fores, that is, strategic, defease* and tactical func-
tions as well as 1ii'aiMirnr1a^1r1 iTti and other aspects* However, the bulk of the
BYaeaea a&* asaaaaa aBeaai ai af Lit • daea Baa* lap- adaUB] lav aadaajf9* *«ejBja«eBB*w em*ep*» j|r* ^*^p* ™as*» ^pep»»ep eeejwPSF ^mm w«*f *«MiH vsHsm ip»*r»» *»•*»j> ^ «ipwTCMviwnM>4ime£s wiw eeee* #MMr
^p^sp* a^a* a wea ^»
^P1^ "»^e^a^(w»» w*aswpw •> «* '•PEpi* a*epa «a>4BMaia eaap^ aapas«a»*jpssa • wajwwi»ffp *y •ae aiPv^kV ^•Aas* *•>* » waaw
p
baaa aost difficult to assess in term of operational and cost-effectiveness.
(2) As pointed out in chapter HP, the problems of cost allocations
oil* epafe otituiiaatec- oi' & aaaj aj elej ... ^v net eteaaa bvjI ass la a ens*
mtTiTiK Timji stage of davoXopaaat*
(3) K« oystem iapoaas heavy lafoiraatloa and paper work reeuire-
meats* Also the burden of an additional workload sterna froa the fact that
cawlttm»on. AiapM Sexylcy, I^^ng on j^ts^^gosture,
doth Cong*, 1st Seas. (Keehincton; SJ. S. Oovornoont Printing Office,
P« 373*
^k^tr NoOuiioui^i, "Sew Concepts in Defense nanninc, Prosrsjaainc and
Budgeting " aha Federal Accountant, VOX. 12, So. X, September, 1>2, 74.
EP* i/0~>L»

Cjc >i\jcairi. U*a Cjii Basai ixxji't! aha feaamVttSSSd -jxityt ISSSaBnsVAa i&iicii la
aot niojcutort to be changed in the mar future.
/k) a<w*> the budoet la tied to the celoottar. the entire nlennlort.
janbisjaHim and budgeting systo* opcimise on an annuaX cycle, altiiauoh tfaa
review process cannot be held to a strict schedule* As a result, the pro-
gnat and budget reviews have tended to overlap in an iwileatrahle say ashing
it difficult tao reflect properly •one of the force structure decisions in
1
the support program In tine to mass budget decisions*
(j) It baa been sainted out bv both t&ooonents and onooaanta of *****
cogt~effectlvenoss analysis that *1iTf*:,?Mrtwfr and risks of the system ftfrffnV*
be fully ackaavlad^txi. ifot %11^ factors can 1*3 Quantified end wywis say not
x-epresent all the intent^Lbles utiles often play detexninlng roles in decloion-
{•) Share are other prebless that f^fftil^ not be overlooked, such as
fluffy* iMffltMiT lfftjft*L1f,in of the top nsaa^eoent hierarchy, a tiae-ieK in asking
cast-affoctlveness studies, difficulties involved In coordination shea pro-
ip.'WA or budget decisions are changed, and the human tendency to resist
2
In leeaat pppP^w the Defense Pepartaent has undertaken a
on the planntnc^pro^snTilnc process in order to laprove the
system. JfcKlasey 6 Company, Inc., the participant In the survey, proposed
a separate decision—t^the presses for "nmjor furce~orientsd'* isnins on one
hand, and "other decisions" on the other hand. 5ais is an attenpt to
TPbr detailed diseussijea of the subject see ibid., pp. cl-73* Also
for a tpwsiaX diocuacion see MoSQsaa ant Anshen, FrelxieaBi Idaitations, and
.-;
. . JB, .35 . SSSBG3BS I BBSSE -
^McJCineey ft Co.. Inc., maosmalkm letter to the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Cosmtztsdlerj on rfoanaMi in the pi mamnAwitr-.v***ir*immm§. **o Process*
dated January 3p ±M , p* 1*

the >Viw lull m null lnj; process in the aoct effective way and to
et^o«iLU» the procedures, thereby reducing workloads and costs. Its win
concern la toe wnaanlnw of tiie progran ehansu control system.
''WoaeothCBpifUfytA decisions" cannot be categorized by &oy standard
and suet be Identified InilviAmXly* Scoe of their ^IffM^Hf**4*^ character*"
latlce are: (1) rdaey have a significant e££wA. on current or future balance
of f&rcos aeons pnmirmi eXeaentfi (FrograBii I« V)i on strategy or tactics*
and on political* ecoaoEiic and rttlttfnry cans4d*Mfctions; and (2) they usually
^rov out of aav nyunmfwrtu of taraate or amjor tertwialfacial uraaUth..^3udbB.
"DthOi* decisions" Trmtrtrw XsrffiTflff frograna VI and VXtf and decisions aro xsado
prlnai'ULy through the rragraai Change Proposaly.
Xt la reoonnended that the "anjor fo*.-oo-oriaatedM Issues be grouped
In "analytical, fatallias" vfaifll1 would be broader In scope than individual
Prograsi rfrmuflf Proposal* Shis will facilitate the integrated decisioo-*
na&ing end rational tcejde~aff$ wbtwc alternatives • AH other pvogran
ip except Research and Dews3npeint» l&lltssry Construction or Capital
I •. ^ ,a i|<W II HHI IIIIIBI H« Bl»IWilM H i
Xb^xL* . est saaasSa

CW19R VI
nuMBUAL mutxziom or ms pbooram hjdoscxk
cryaipff pro mm frnmatM MTTrTWl'T ^MJfrFM ^fMfftfy
2ho effectiveness and successful Its/1! "TflnntetIon odf tbo prQjreci
ois&lar systens for their defense isMMgSMHst* 2b Korea the military eetab-
llabnent has adopted the basic siilltary doctrines of the United Slates 10
well as aeny Aaavloan artBrtnlatratlve procedures ae a result of ita nasi: with
the Military Assistance and Advisory Group [MftAOi and the fact that laree
susburs of ita nllitary personnel have "been trained in the Waited States*
However, time far no efforts haw bam nade to ttfowty and isjplen&nt
great budgeting concept in the ffnwan adlltary establislsaaat. Uhla chtjpu
will ahoy how sons of the aspects of the protjrssi budgeting system could be
fliyV^r-uft t» the Korean defease budget*
She national budget system of Korea was adopted vhea the Constitution
of the net? republic wee written la 1,-Ad, Su^seQiisnt legislation, the flaaaet
Lav, provided the statutory basis for budgetary accounting proeedurco. In
Korea today, where the form of the ©overnaent is patterned after the




poroeideiitlal system la ijonsral* the Ch&lrcec of the Soononic JPlenning Board
UBBj wbo scxrvuc MBWMHHdAy r** *i*i BlMtOF RMhdnjf iiflc* ciso pivlije MM ) n*
olbillty over buaaet farouUtton and review and eneoutlon la the tea of
flBKVtlOBHBft control* 9m budnet ***""*« " i loth ennandltufen sad revenues
for a budget year IB*j—the fiscal year eataeiding with the mlfnnter jeer.
She bucljot 1b auJbtaittQd aauually to the flitil^tal Ass&abiy by the PresiAkxxt
for review and approval.
it^ Budget and Accounting Lav* t^n*^ superadded the Finance law and
jaajlaaantad the perfonaancQ budget concept in Ijul, requires the CtMiirzanii of
/*ht BMndii VtmnrAner Board to **—»» A budfiBSt DOllCY afld ^UldttQDS letter \BT
the and of March ia the current yaar aa approved by the state Council and
2
the President, qpon roooigfc of the budget policy and guidance latter,
ana ndndadjQf ci*i aMwanaajl li >-"Jcy in^nejMa ;,t>.o andnni natiandHi M 8 pwn
ajana basis fffifl auitaBita then to the Bureau of the Budget in the Boanondo
HLaaning Board by the end of May*
A prallirrtnary study and a review of the budget estlaates are eon*
Aftyfofl oy ^1^ staffs in the Tunmii of the Budget ^fy^tgft fornaX and iufbsiaal
boarlnoa with officials frost n&nletriee and ajjjnor tum eoneeruod. Xentativo
decisions are nade by the Cha^Jnaan of the fiaononic Planning Board who
the budget to the State Council, the local corporate body coapoeod of all




ihwwitv [She Constitution of the e—^^ *« of KoreaJ*





V^n^nteflT fflagb, Arte. 33, d>^

In early Septsofoer • he subs&to iiis budget request to the ffpttTiwafr Aases&dy,
together with his Budget Message far review end approval.
The iteuloaal (luirtiV of Korea is set y$ on & unlcauftral basis
,
vfrfy^B fftandias ooraaa-ttoos In the national Aoecnidy ere organized alas*_j tho
President's tav kjet request end forward it to the Special Goaadttee on Budget
and Accounts for overall iwviow. Q» resolutions of the Ojuactsl Coaalttee
ajpiijwil is by vote la the fbm of chang* forest and bang* units of budget
divisions, which ere used for 'budgetary control purposes* Without approval
of the Ms (I tinml Anmiwfl iHyj ao transfer of ruodu can be BUft? anons the budget
titles described above, ooltectivoly celled "legislative titles. ftl
Thirty days prior to the start of the new budget year the Hit. Ionia!
Assenldy approves or andlfSns the in is.me<nl budget ^wfl returns it to the
President for svoelsss&inn. itw* flatinosl AsasBft&r has ao authority to la*
crease the proposed budget or establish new budget titles without coaseBt of
the eascutlve breach of the @pwenann*t« Usually the budget review is pre-
ceded by aa inspection tour of &ovoiueont operations by legislators on the
I ; feasjtti a_i asjsji v ifjc najrib i -
She approved budget ^^mryyfc. be iqplonented mitjj^ it is VftEft\*-\ twt^ by
the fioonoBlc lOannlng Board to the ministries sad seencies on a quarterly
basis* Wnen a request Iron a ministry or agency for spportloaaent of its
budget in i^w* with its eneratiaa nrotccssi is node, the Bureau of the Budget
tsjass into consideration the inname aspects as provided by the Ministry of
W—Bfr Art. ».
nQaaaasBdaiBiik Baanob. Art* 50*
%id., Art. $3*

Finance and Bakes necessary adJuBtaents la aster to control the rate of
(jovaraasnt expenditures according to fund availability and the (jWWftl
'JCUQDLX v<U3U O* vtlB SKSSOHt
the Cnsirnen of the Eooacsalc PLsaninij Board hoc to seomio thQ President'g
i
approval throu^B the State Couudl. Asportlosjaaofaa arc allotted by the
uinitrbers and. agency needs to the bureaus* divisions* or field activities*
after voice obligations say *u© incurred.
Auditing la oorihicted lay the Audit Board—caesosed of aore than five
::sut favor than eleven civilian auditoro*-*^tildli is a semi~independent* $uasi«*
Judicial organlaatlnn. SUo t^pea of audit are perfoiTrwd the traditional
or legal post-audit* and am essaaluatioa of efficiency and econoey la gevera-
sent <waret-l flffM> t An "wm^ audit report la suU-iittod to tba President end
to the national Aiumflnl m > ISnch ministry and agency ftae* sons forct of iatoraal
audit aystea for internal oomtrol purposes*' so far no ataedard procedures
have been established throucjhout the eovernoent.
IftMBflMKi Ivej^HHatbal Met ftat(prttefcaj
In the IfUltary j&tablJ&esisit
me Ministry of nmtdfml Defease [MID j, tfce only civilian represen-
tative uho sits oa the state Council, la entrusted vita full authority over
the Military aQenclee~~4he Arey* the Navy fnrTuding the Marine Corps, and the
Defense College Including the Joint Staff CoUtiue* «Jbint Construction Agency,
and others. 3
> Art. 35, sec. 2.
IHy^- Arte. JZ-J+* (It belongs to the President but
i
%ifcoottiochlfcanfr [the Assad Forces Qraaniaatioa layJ, Art.

la the Korean nUltary esteblioliaaat there are no civilian heads
of adlitary agencies equivalent to tbe aervlco secretaries la the (felted
States military ostaaaiataat. She President, required by lav to be a
civilian, exercises control ova? all military matters through too Minister
However, actual operational 1 i isaml for the
of Korea la in the hands of the GoBBea&sr-in-Chief, Baited fctiono Coaaaad,
ao a reault of the daleraKtion of authority durina the TTorosn war*
!Eha Amy la the largest Korean solitary agency and has approodaataly
1)20,000 aen, followed in else by the Sevy including the Marine Corpa with
slice of the defense budget goes to the Amy. In the XJ&5 Budget Year, out
of total defense expenditures of 23 billion tana, T6.3 percent went to the
Any, j.Q percent to the Oavy inolndinB the Marine corps, 7*1 percent to
the Air Force, and 6.3 percent lor the Ministry of national Defense and
awlsal ftafHaW Ifi I aH
b
'
In the defense budget, 3t^i percent was spent for
Bay and Allowances, 37«& peiuont for Subsistence in Kinds, 9+k percent for
Clothing, 15.4 percent for Troop Maintenance, and 1*3 percent for Force
£z&roveaant. Combining the Tlvst three percentages shoes that more than 33
percent of defense ffyif^flip is used in aalntelnin& personnel, both adlltery
and civilian, and a negligible ancuat goes for force i&proveoent purposes*
Jasetrous attespts, largely by the Assay sector, have been aade to
laprove the budgetary process for efficient and eorwwmie utilisation of
jDeahanadnlsik Boosob. Art* 72*
SAOy 14, 1950 by Fiiaeideat Syngnea Ehoe.
%he source is baaed on the quarterly assort prepared by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Republic of Korea, Xjb$ .
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Jaataflftftwi* the Ministry of national Defense PwaAlei (Seoul* korea

defense spooling. The performance budget concept, iqpleaented in the Army
in lyjj, took the form of a rearrangement of the budget structure to acet
i
the primary program categories of the Array. These efforts resulted in the
successive reduction of budget titles used by the military services. The
number of budget titles was reduced from 23 to 18 in &fej to 13 in li*£,
to 11 in 1963> and to 6 in &9&* Current titles are:
(1) Personnel Maintenance and Management
(2) Troop Maintenance and Management
(3) Procurement of Bguignent and Materiel
(4) Construction and Heal Property
(5) Research, Developpent, Test, and Evaluation
(6) Reserve Personnel.
The budget cycle in the Korean military establishment starts with
the development and review of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan [JSQP]
annually by the Joint Chiefs of Staff based, on the Mid-Range Bsti-
[MRS] of the services. 23*e purpose of the Jbint Strategic Objectives
Plan is to provide the basic guidance for the programs and budgets to be used
in the Ministry of national Defense, projected for five years* It develops
a strategic concept, determines military requirements, and studies the
employment and deployment of military forces during the mid-range period.
The important aspect of this plan is that it provides the Defense Ministry
with an estimate of the required force structure which will be used in
h\(K Army Has., Sin Yu&xm Yesancheto {.the Hew Army Budgetary System] ,
Study Report, Vol. 1 (Seoul, Korea: The Army Printing Plant, 19&0, pp. k~Q.
T*0K Army Bqs., Yulaoon Soagiarachuyi Yesancheto [the Army PerftaMpce
tot System] j Army Pamphlet 37-2 (Seoul, Korea: The Army Printing Plant,
165), pp. 10-11.

developing guidelines for the next budget year* She owe realistic the
plan, the better the outcome of the defease budget.
As noted earlier, the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan provides the
basis for the Five Year Defense Program which becomes the foundation of the
Program and Xtodget Guidelines as veil as the Basic Defense Programs., Each
service prepares budget estimates on the basis of Its operating or basic
program which has been developed from the Service Strategic Objectives Plan,
the Control Program (in the Army), and the Service Program and Budget
Guidance. Obese are all geared to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, the
Five Tear Defease Program, and the Program and Budget Guidance of the
Ministry of national Defense [MsD], respectively. Program categories are
in terns of resource inputs such as Troop Programs (Personnel,
Intelligence and Training), Logistics Program, Military
l
Construction Program, Research and Development Program, and Reserve Program.
Approximately thirteen months prior to the Budget Year each service
fViim* I****** the Program and Budost Guidance to his resnectivo field units
based on the Ministry of national Defense guidance and its own long-range
program, and, upon receipt a£ these Initial projections, develops the operat-
Budget Estimates. She budget estimates, reviewed and coordinated by
the general staffs, the compti^ollers and advisory committees at the head-
quarters level, are submitted to the Ministry of national Defense before
Hay. When the President noises a final decision on budget requests and sub-
mits them to the national Assembly, each military service's Program and Budget
Bequests are modified and revised accordingly* When the national Assembly
2
approves the budget requests, they become final.
j, In-Sung, p. 77.
^Sin Tukoon Yassjwhato, pp. 38-40.

Within the Ministry of rational Defense, most budget reviews are
by the functional bureau staffs and an ad hoc committee. The
Joint Staffs in the Joint Chiefs of Staff review the service budgets for
education, training, and intelligence. The Defease Comptroller, usually an
Army general officer, has the primary responsibility for coordinating the
budget review in the Defense Ministry. Ho then presents the results of
his review to a conference of bureau directors and the Military Policy
Council, composed of the Deputy Defense Minister, the Assistant Defease
Ministers, the Chairnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Service Chiefs,
presided over by the Defease Minister. Bore the final decisions are reached.
She defease budget is submitted to the Kcoaomic Planning Board for further
deliberations and inclusion in the President's budget.
After due process and subsequent enactment of the budget by the
Battiwal Assembly, the budget is apportioned, allotted and euballotted
through established administrative channels; obligations are incurred and
expenditures aade by the operating units.
Program progress is reported regularly to the headquarters of the
military services and to the Ministry of national Defense, and the analysis
and evaluation of program performance are conducted at both levels on a
quarterly basis. Usually the comptrollers of the services and the Defense
Controllers are responsible for progress reporting, and they recommend
necessary actions to correct or alleviate significant deviations in the
performances to the respective line management. 2he quarterly reports of





ttus far the aaaaination of the graces* of planning, prosrawalag
aaA budgeting In the allitary xitAuLlshaant of Ko:«aa as it exists aal is
practiced today has been briefs 3toe first analysln begins with the deter-
iiiaatian of military requirements and pracraa review, A student in military
it in 19^1 revealed that there was a wide gap "between the Joint
1
Strategic Objectives Flan and fiscal reality. There existed neither a
basic national security policy aer any specific gnidaliaas for military
planning, therefore, the Joint Staffs in the Mai Chiefs of Staff tended
to develop military requirements in absolute ( ?m irith limited coasidera-
w*w^ft «a «^i* ** *^Bw^jj^* v^fc* ^f >^> ^n>sk9 wifc «wMMSWa# * a>aa^* na*™* w^^isuff^rtwwa (a^Mwaa'^saflPa^^" a ^^s^awn^^a-T^^^ %^*i^»^p^^f
tioas in the united States defease planning prior to the program budgeting
system. What, if any, chafes aide since are not lasovn.
It Is difficult for Hie Defease Minister to gkm responsible ,jui&~
aace aa to the outlook of the defense budget whan economic prospects for
future years are uncertain, a-*! the amounts and contents of the military
aaaistancc to be provided by the Ualted States are not accurately detemdn-
able at the planning stages. Tb* Defense Minister aaada both sides of the
picture in order to hare a complete and integrated view of the estimates of
future defease speadings. In fact, It has often baaa cited that the lack of
information on United States assistance haulers realistic Korean military
planning and prograaainis. Zn view of the differences in the fiscal years
between the United States and Korea, and frequent delays by Congress in
acting on foreign aid bills, inevitable reluctance in making any prior
coaaitaoats at the operating levels is understandable. Sons advance
Chin* Chona-Su. Sun fftimmrtH !»*»—
v
Surinkmchanx a kusmhan »>»»»»»i
[A study of the Military Mid-Range Ktaanlng Irocedures J, uapublished
Master's thesis, the Seoul national University, 136I, pp, 60-63.

Vinforms*** is* III* future prospects of military assistance, at least
for planning purposes, should be provided to Korean as Fasj official*.
w*ar present clrcusstaaoes, planning and pir^ iearning formulation
of Korean military nmmln—ntii aenaot be determined realistically. 0b»
vioualy such programs are Incapable of providing eolid oases for oudget-makla
hscsMaa they are expressed vitujut full ooralderation of future financial
ooneesusness. m***** in theory there racists a transformation device **rf#!
would brides the see between »^—<— mi laaleetlna. in reality the theory
doss not work. Therefore the results have often consisted of significant
modifications and revisions of the progress from inception until final
passage by the national AssemMy, frequently after hurriedly having fceea
formulated vlthin the period of a few weeks.
Military planning Is performed in terns of missions and military
units of forces, whereas programming and budgeting are considered In terns
of incuts such as nsrsoanal. eeeretlon and maintenance, nroeureeent. eon*
struction, etc. So far no attempt has bean made to relate the resource
iaeuts to military outputs when nelor nroaram. or budest deaisions are to be
made, nor for alternative annas to achieve the es^^lflfof*^ finals and
Mm as ^^ssnaas*ePMb^t^QnMta^^j ^mmumm'* ^^^w^ess wm ^^^*^»si^^p ^^^fc ™ "s^iw* ™w sb^ww*i ^s ^v v^^wmm^w ^^ ^sw «#we* ^^^sps^^^
involved. Without critical exsminetlon of alternatives, rational or sound
decisions cannot be eaqpected. slumy they would be hnsflil on intuition, and
tfottffrefl judgments arft experience.
It has been customary in the Korean Gyvernaaat for the £conasuc
planning Board to establish a "budast cellias ' sad ianose it unon *>'*'*
tfffvei imiimhil units In order to heap the total public expenditures within
certain fiscal Units. She ceiling approach in itself is a powerful
and nay be a sound practice when used in the proper psrspsetive Tunsjsjs

Bthere is always a practical Unit on government spending. However, as
Maurice U. 3tans, former Director of the Bureau of the Budget under Presi-
dent Elsenhower, has iapliod, there should be no :fixed frozen limit on
pending on the budget.'' Msvertheleas, the budget ceiling in Korea 1*
detemined and rigidly adhered to without conBidei*ation of real program
needs , and with little participation by the agencies affected* Tbls, in
effect, has severely hampered efforts toward better programs and budget
formulation by agency officials, since a new program obviously would not
survive if it were not within the ceiling*
In reviewing the Korean budget it is not surprising to find that
the reviewers tend to emphasize the budget ceiling, the amounts of increase
over current year, formate, snministrative procedures, etc., rather than
i, program priorities, validity of the cost figures and other
3
factors. In recent years there have oeeu several is^rcweaeats in stand-
ardising cost figures among the services and providing a degree of flex-
ibility in budget formulation in program terms, solitary agencies are
encouraged to submit an addsn&usi budget if the total amounts of their Imfljjwt
estimates exceed the established budget ceiling*
In formulation and review of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan,
lack of communication, participation and eventual coordination among bureaus
or divisions within the Defense Ministry and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to a
hi. s., Senate Subcommittee, Bearings* p. 1117
.
%WK Army Logistics School, Won-hwa Yesan [Bsaa Budget]. Pamphlet,
&.d«, circa 19^3, W* THtli
^Chin, Chong-Su, p^. 71-72.
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05je Ministry of national Defense, Kihwek mit Yeaan^ichim* BY IjdC
[Program aad Budget Guidance for By 1^66 3, March 15, 2£6$«
M*
if ' •./ jlvq eoiii/*ibu<AJu fcflBMi aafelSI Mai s**SBI tsa^nalaln and LiL^/oisl • ", >'.^iOT^^n^ ^b^***1 *»^»*WV^*» *r^*^*J*»^»» •»•»»«» w^F**»» ^*"-rf w**» ^W *^*a*^*w*w*^^i »*m.*»^»> MNHHN 4MOTVHIVV>"M^V W*JM**M** *j**»>*a*> mMMMMW w*»»^»T •»
Ba wmm attanjtten pevjvniia li tha pmm of pmpai Ml Man*, miwi
It is evident that without harmony and concerted group efforto, it la
difficult to accoBpllah common goals and objectives*
During the last few years, several moves have been made to
liyyt the Korean military organization* One is tbo osta^llahmant of several
Joint acisnrlas under tbo direct control of the Doftiinwi Ministry such aa the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Haitimil Defense Collar, the Joint Construction
Agency> the Joint Investigation Agency, and the Selective Service and
Recruiting Office* In addition. nuserous studies have been nade on the
posnl"htr integration of oervico academies* technical schools* hospitals* and
other institutions* Also there has lean an increasing tendency to centralise
authority in the Defense Ministry and to enlarge civilian control over the
military agencies on major rtiifiwnwi problems such aa force structure* budget
and naraoooal***H^^*»*» JMF^*nW *»*r^»F»^»»'**™*"^»» W
m the preceding discussion it use noted that a degree of similarity
exists) between the Korean military establishment today and the ffftft^ states
tJfrfurMT ealfafrT IslMifftit prior to the Implansmtetion of the prograa budgeting
system* In Korea there la a considerable gap between military planning and
budgeting* military resource inputa are not related to the outputs* the
porfbrmsnee budget concept is interpreted in terse of sisplifying and
streamlining the budget titles* the f^THttg approach is prevalent* budgetary
reejuirementa are projected for one year in the future* coordination and
conmnalcetlon are lacking vlthin the defense eetablishBent* and integration
of ""iffftu t functions and concentration of authority la the Defense Ministry
\ajln* Ghong-3u* pp. <3» 73.

77
It can be argued that the nilitsry situation in Korea today is
vastly different from that la the {tatted states , and that no valid compari-
son can be nadet. Of course Korea is not capable of uaging all-™t nuclear
war, ror does she possess the aaeeasary resourcos sad tschaology to develop
costly weapons. Moreover, tlvs defense problaa of Korea nm^it to be coa*
Biderad in the light of a broader concept of ths "collective security' of the
free world. Iteverthsleas, the intrinsic process of decision-waking ^er
defease Tsuwgwswt differs in degree, not in kMfel therefore a program
budgeting approach in the Korean solitary establishment would he of ^reat
value. She goal of pragma bu&getias is to search for the aaet econor
ally feasible and efficient ways of achieving objectives throu£$h systosKtic
analysis of alternatives in tevni of the costo and benefits. Presuming
these premises to be valid; there is ao reason "Why Korea should not benefit




Since World War II, tho defense budget has developed into ft strong
driving force leading toward 'real unification" in the American defense
establishment, especially since the enactment of the national Security Act
of 1947* la the United States today the defense budget is the principal
management tool in the Defense Department. It is not only the instrument by
which resources are allocated but also the means for controlling military
programs, since strategy, programming, and budgeting are all aspects of the
same basic decision-making process.
The first step toward military unification in the United States took
place when the national Security Act of l]Ar( was passed. Subsequent amend-
ments to the Act show the trend toward more centralised authority in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and stronger civilian control over the
military services. At the same time, heavier pressures have been placed on
the need for economy and efficiency in defense spending, largely because of
the tremendous smounts of defense eacDenditures ***** their insect on the
national economy.
Until 1961, efforts to improve financial management in the Defease
Department were concentrated on simplifying and streamlining the appropria-
tion structures in order to implement the performance budget concept. Prior
to this time the defense budget had been a critical theme of and often the
basis for sharp controversy among the services and in the Defense Department,
but there existed no means of enabling the Secretary of Defense to solve
78

this problem rationally. 5!ho defense budget took the form of the celling
approach," end the budget seldom was related to military tasks and missions
or national security objectives la a meaningful manner. Military planning
aad financial management were regarded as independent activities, the former
being in the hands of the military planners and projected veil into the
future, and the latter being handled by civilian counterparts oa an annual
basis. So bridge this gap the nsv programming system va* established by
Secretary of Defense, Robert 8* McJtamara, and Charles J. Bitch.
In the new system all activities of the Defease Department are
grouped under major programs which, in turn, consist of program elements
organised according to missions and tasks regardless of traditional service
Jurisdiction. Otoe Five Year Force Structure and Financial Flan is basically
the suomary of ft"* 1 approved programs in the Defense Department and includes
all of the program data, together with the description of forces, their
tasks and missions, procurement lists, facility lists, and other relevant
information. These programs are continually being reviewed, modified aad
updated to meet rhan£fwi in the environmental "'vrtltlfflfMi through a Program
Change Control System*
She annual budgeting procedure consists of converting a one-year
slice of the approved five-year programs into an appropriate budget with
supporting details organised in a more orderly and systematic manner. This
eliminates the hurried program review which was previously crammed into a
few weeks in the midst of the annual budget review.
In order to reveal full cost implications of a program, costs are
classified into Research and Development, Xnvestmsnt, and iterating Costs.

Resources are broken down into Items of Equipment, Military Construction,
Manpower, and Operations and Maintenance so ao to permit explicit planning
for the acquisition and financing; of resource Inputs. Use of the Cost Infor-
mation and Progress Reporting Systems facilitates evaluation and control of
program performance.
One of the outstanding features of the new program budgeting system
is the cost-effectiveness study of available alternatives. This is not
intended as a substitute for good judgment but hopefully as a device to
sharpen judgment by analysing the costs against the benefits or performances
of alternatives involved. She new system thus provides a sound basis for
decision-making, and serves to reorient the thinking of military planners
toward more systematic and quantitative terms*
Problems and difficulties are Involved of course in the new system,
a few of which are: (l) difficulties in defining some programs and program
elements j (2) difficulties in getting accurate cost dataj (3) added paper
work; (if) tendency to overlap program and budget reviews; (5) some limlta-
In the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In order to overcome some of
these contingencies, the Department of Defense has recently undertaken a
management survey. However, no changes have been announced.
Despite these restrictions the new system has proved to be an im-
provement over the old management tool and significantly more effective. It
provides the Secretary of Defense and his immediate advisors with meaningful
information by which they are able to make major decisions on future defense
programs. With this management tool at his command, the Secretary of
Defense Is now capable of exercising his authority, direction and control

in aa effective meaner* Sirough the use of the planning, programming and
budgeting eyetam the Xoqq-qo^xq "real unification" of the armed services




Use of the program budgeting system in the Korean military .estab-
lishment is difficult Mrfanae of the unioue military situation of Korea
today, the size and nature of the defease budgets, and the political,
economic and social factors involved, nevertheless the new way of looking
at the Korean defease budget <rtmmm he helpful and beneficial in achieving
better allocation of defease resources as veil as enhancing eeoaomy and
efficiency.
Perhaps the most significant contribution* are the introduction Of
the cost-effectiveness mproarli and the economic study of defense problems
as a basis for sound decision- mslrlng to orient the traditional way of think-
ing into critical search and analysis of alternatives in terms of costs end
Another benefit would be the attempt to relate the roaourcti iasmts
to military outputs in terns of missions, tasks and national security ob-
jectives, in order to obtain a& integrated view of defense spending*
Similar efforts should be directed toward integrating long-range
planning to programs which in turn would lean to treating the budget in a
more systematic and meaningful manner. Before a decision is made there
should always be a considerable projection of a major program into the
future in financial terms*
Xhe Republic of Korea is required to rasintaln large military forces
for national security in order to deter or be ready to meet the threat of

rn—hiIbwj i mwifi—tV, large portions of itit national resources are
il located for defense purposes. Since the country is snail and lte
defame damanrtfl are large, it is imperative that there "be effective, effi-
cient, and justifiable utilisation of public funds iu all areas of the
Korean ailitary sstahllabna&t. Top ainagamtnt of the defease organisation
should continually probe the best ways to allocate resources and control
performances in order to accosplish national security objectives in the
oast competent and expeditious iaanner. In this respect, the program budget-
ing system deserves further study in order to Ufrtawwuit its applicability
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